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ABSTRACT
YUN(SEAN) ZHANG: Friendship Formation and Smoking
Initiation Among Teens
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie)
In this research, I use a unique data set to examine the effect of peer influence on teen
smoking initiation. First, I develop a game theoretic model where friendship network and
smoking decisions are modeled as the equilibrium outcome of a Bayesian Nash game. A unique
feature of my model is that individuals choose both teens’ friends and smoking decisions
simultaneously to maximize utility. Second, I develop an empirical strategy that allows me
to estimate the structural equations that arises out of the theoretical model. Identification
depends on instrumental variables that exogenously shift peer smoking norms through either
friendship probabilities or individual smoking probabilities. I apply my estimator to The
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. Estimation results suggest that peer
influence is an important determinant of teen smoking. I also find evidence suggesting that
friendship sorting based on racial conformity explains why black teens have a lower smoking
rate than white teens. Policy simulation results indicate that although peer influence, as a
social multiplier, amplifies the cigarette tax deterrent effect on smoking, it primarily promotes
smoking.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Literally, hundreds of studies in the public health, sociology and psychology literatures
confirm a strong positive correlation between individual smoking and peer smoking among
teens (e.g., Kandel, 1978; van Roosmalen and McDaniel, 1989, 1992; Crane, 1991; Graham
et al., 1991; Brooks-Gunn et al., 1993; Bauman and Ennet, 1994, 1996). In a comprehensive
review, Bauman and Ennett (1996) conclude that peer smoking is the most important risk
factor for teen smoking. These studies strongly suggest that (conforming) peer effects on
smoking exist.1 Peer effects are a double-edged sword. On one hand, they motivate an agent
to smoke when the agent has smoker friends; on the other hand, they discourage an agent
from smoking when the agent has nonsmoker friends. This implies that both the direction
and the magnitude of smoking peer effects on an agent depend on the agent’s peer smoking
norm.2 We further note that an agent’s peer smoking norm is endogenous because an agent
chooses her friends. Thus, evaluating the overall impact of peer effects on teen smoking entails
understanding teen friendship. So far, little is known about friendship formation among teens
and, consequently, whether peer effects promote or contain teen smoking is still unclear.
The presence of a cigarette tax further complicates peer effects on smoking. Peer effects
lead to a so called ”social multiplier effect” (Sheinkman, 2006; Hoxby, 2000; Epple and
1If peer effects are disconforming, then we should expect that teens with smoker friends are less likely to
smoke. In this paper, peer effects consistently refer to conforming peer effects.
2Following convention, an agent’s peer smoking norm is defined as the average of the agent’s friends’ smoking
actions. Therefore, it is a (nonlinear) function of three endogenous components: the agent’s own peer selection
action, others’ peer selection actions, and others’ smoking actions, with the first two governing friendship
outcomes.
Romano, 1998). Consider a school that introduces a $25 fine for on-campus smoking. Besides
the direct smoking disincentive caused by the $25 fine, a student’s expectation of a lower
peer smoking norm should serve as an additional smoking disincentive if peer influence exists.
Following this ”social multiplier effect” argument, peer effects should amplify the deterrent
effect of a cigarette tax on teen smoking. Given this research context, this paper investigates
two research questions. First, do peer effects on teen smoking initiation exist? Second, if peer
effects exist, how do they affect teen smoking initiation as the cigarette tax varies?
If peer influence matters, then a rational agent behaves strategically in the sense that the
agent makes decisions based on her expectation of others’ decisions. Therefore, it is natural
to model peer effects using a game theoretic approach. In this paper, I model high school
students’ smoking decisions under peer effects in a static simultaneous-move pure strategy
Bayes game. In the game, a student chooses both a peer selection action and a smoking
action.
Decision interdependence creates an identification concern regarding peer effect estimates.
Different from single-agent utility maximization problems, in a game an agent’s actions on
all outcomes of interest (say, smoking and peer selection) are functions of not only her own
personal exogenous characteristics but also others’ personal exogenous characteristics. This
dependence implies that an agent’s equilibrium peer smoking norm is inherently a function
of her own personal (both observed and unobserved) exogenous characteristics. As a conse-
quence, an agent’s peer norm is correlated with the agent’s unobserved (by the economist)
heterogeneity leading to an identification concern.
To address the concern over identification, my empirical strategy uses the recent two-
stage method for estimation of discrete games (Bajari et al., 2006; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler, 2003). The first stage involves instrumenting for agents’ endogenous peer smoking
norms through reduced form analyses; the second stage estimates a behavioral model of smok-
ing that allows for smoking peer effects. In the presence of peer effects, even if endogenous
peer smoking norms and exogenous characteristics affect an agents’ latent index of smoking
linearly and additively in a behavioral specification, the corresponding reduced-form repre-
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sentation of endogenous actions is complicated.3 As such, an agent’s peer smoking norm is
a complicated function of exogenous characteristics. This suggests that the economist wants
to instrument endogenous peer norms through flexibly-specified reduced-form models; other-
wise, the impact of instrumental variables on the peer norm cannot be fully captured. With
this caveat in mind, in the first stage of estimation, I instrument endogenous peer smoking
norms in three steps sequentially. First, I instrument individual equilibrium smoking proba-
bilities using a nonparametric bagged tree classifier. Second, I instrument friendship through
a flexibly specified logit model. Last, I recover instrumented peer smoking norms using the
instrumented individual smoking probabilities and the instrumented friendship probabilities.
Both parental characteristics and school sizes are used as instrumental variables and both of
them could be correlated with school-level unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, in estimat-
ing the behavioral model in the second stage, I further control for school-level unobserved
heterogeneity through school fixed effects.4
The data used in this study are from the in-home wave I survey of the National Lon-
gitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). Add Health is unique for its detailed
measurements of friendship networks among schoolmates. This data advantage allows me to
estimate peer influence on smoking based on true peer composition instead of subjectively
defined peer groups (such as schools or classes) as used in previous studies (e.g., Norton et
al., 1998; Lundborg, 2006).
Estimation results indicate that peer effects on smoking initiation are significant and
homogenous among teens in different grades. In all grades (7 to 12), a one percent increase in
the peer smoking norm causes about the same amount of increase in the probability of smoking
initiation. Interestingly, although the observed smoking rate among white teens is significantly
higher than that among black teens, after controlling for peer influence, smoking initiation
3In a game, the reduced-form representation of the outcome process is, in essence, a Nash equilibrium
strategy that maps exogenous inputs into endogenous outcome(s).
4Parents choose schools for their kids, therefore, correlation between parental characteristics and school-
level unobserved heterogeneity is expected. School size may be correlated with some unobserved school level
heterogeneity also. For example, in small schools, teachers may have more interactions with students; this may
help to prevent smoking initiation.
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rates among black teens are found to be 7 percentage points higher than that among white
teens. Meanwhile, racial conformity is found to be a significant predictor for teen friendship.
Collectively, the results suggest that friendship sorting based on racial conformity significantly
reverses the racial smoking rate gap. This finding provides another potential explanation for
the racial smoking rate gap puzzle (US Dept of Health and Human Services, 1998).
Without controlling for peer influence, the marginal tax deterrent effect on the smoking
initiation rate is -3.86 percentage points per 10 cents with a standard error of 1.81. After
controlling for peer effects, the state cigarette tax deterrent effect falls slightly to -3.68 per-
centage points per 10 cents with a larger standard error of 2.29 percentage points. Such a
drop in tax effect indicates that social interaction amplifies the tax deterrent effect on smoking
initiation in the field. This study compares different specifications that attempt to control
for peer influence and the results indicate that using the school norms as an explanatory
variable to capture peer influence underestimates peer influence by six fold. In addition, even
if one can obtain peer norm measures, failing to control for its endogeneity completely will
underestimate peer influence by five to ten fold.
The presence of peer effects complicates policy simulations. In situations with peer effects,
a policy perturbation directly affects every agent’s actions on both peer selection and smoking,
and in turn, affects every agent’s peer smoking norm. Consequently, the ceteris paribus style
policy simulation is inappropriate because it is conceptually incorrect to hold an agent’s peer
smoking norm constant while perturbing policy variables. Policy simulation in a smoking
game with peer effects entails searching for an equilibrium that satisfies both the smoking
equation and the friendship equation. In operation, I iterate an initial smoking probability
vector over a behavioral smoking equation and a reduced form friendship equation until
the smoking probability vector converges uniformly across every agent. Policy simulation
results indicate two patterns. First, at certain cigarette tax thresholds, a small increase
in the cigarette tax causes the smoking rate to drop abruptly reflecting that at those tax
thresholds the social multiplier effect is so strong that students make smoking decisions in a
herding pattern. Second, although the existence of peer influence significantly amplifies the
deterrent effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initiation, it promotes teen smoking initiation
4
more severely. Combined, peer influence is a significant promoting factor for teen smoking
initiation.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides a theoretical
framework to endogenize both the friendship decision and other decisions (e.g., smoking).
Previous theoretical models (Manski, 1995; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Bajari et al., 2006)
begin by considering a reference group of people (say N people) in which an agent’s utility on
an action is affected by all the other N-1 agents’ actions.5 Unfortunately, these models fail to
explain how the reference group comes into being in the first place ignoring that a reference
group is endogenously chosen by agents collectively. As a contribution, my model explains
not only strategic decision on actions other than peer selection among members in a reference
group but also how agents choose friends strategically to form the reference group.
In this paper, the reader can gain insights on the econometric concerns associated with
estimation of a Bayes game with peer influence, which cannot be seen easily otherwise. For
example, the theoretical model reveals that estimating friendship selection and other actions
jointly across all agents, in general, is impossible due to the curse of dimensionality. Also,
the derivation of the econometric specification shows the reader exactly which elements are
absorbed into the error term. Furthermore, the reader will see why in the first stage of the
estimation of the game, the economist is willing to trade model interpretability for flexibility.
Policy simulations in the peer effect studies (e.g. Norton, 1998; Krauth, 2006; Lundborg,
2006; Cooley, 2007) only allow agents to choose actions given their friendships. This practice
is flawed because it ignores that fact that a rational agent should update her friendships while
choosing other actions in order to maximize her expected utility. This study contributes to
the literature by conducting policy simulations that allow agents to choose friends while also
choosing other actions (e.g., smoking).
5This implicitly imposes a strong assumption that any one of the N player’s utility associated with an
action is affected by any one of the rest of the N-1 players’ actions. So, asymmetric friendships among agents
are ruled out in these models.
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Chapter 2
Background
Traditionally, economists have focused on the effects of price, income, addiction, and
various regulations on cigarette consumption. In studying those effects, economists typically
model the cigarette consumption decision as a single-agent utility maximization problem
(Becker and Murphy, 1988; Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Cook and Moore, 2000). This
framework disallows the possibility that an agent’s smoking action has a direct impact on
another agent’s utility (i.e., peer influence). In a widely cited work on social interaction,
Manski (1995) argues that an agent’s decision may affect other agents’ decisions through
three different interactions: preferences, constraints, and expectations. In teen smoking, the
potential existence of complementary preferences in the smoking dimension — a teen receives
direct utility if conformity between personal smoking and the peer smoking norm exists —
cannot be ruled out. Some economists have noticed the potential existence of peer influence.
Lewitt et al. (1981) argued that peer effects may increase the magnitude of price elasticity
in cigarette consumption. Becker (1992) showed that addiction and peer effects both would
increase the magnitude of the price elasticity.
In the peer effects literature, empirical researchers have proposed various strategies to
correct for endogeneity bias in peer effects. Ideally, one could correct for this endogeneity
bias by estimating decisions (both the outcome of interest, say smoking, and peer selection)
across all agents jointly. Doing so, in general, is infeasible because the high dimensionality of
the peer selection decision involves an extremely large number of repeated observations over
all agents in a self-containing reference group.1 Such a data requirement is too demanding to
1To illustrate this point, let us consider a smoking game with only N = 10 agents. To simplify the problem,
be practical often times. So far, few studies have modeled peer effects in a game. Bajari et
al. (2006) model peer effects on stock recommendation. The nature of the financial market
determines that major stock appraising firms do not choose their peers. Therefore, peer
selection is not a concern in that study. Krauth (2006) models teens’ smoking decisions in
a pure strategy game of complete information. Krauth (2006) controls for peer selection
by allowing individual unobserved heterogeneity (in the smoking equation) to be correlated
across agents and no instrumental variables are used to instrument endogenous peer norms.2
Some studies use exogenous peer arrangements (e.g., random assignment of roommates)
in experiments to evaluate peer effects (Kremer and Levy, 2001; Sacerdote, 2001; Katz et
al., 2001; Eisenberg, 2004). Whether this approach can successfully purge off correlation
between one’s endogenous peer norm and her own error term is open to debate. Experiments
perturb the distribution of an agent’s potential friends’ characteristics, and thus ”restrict” an
agent’s peer selection. The degree of this ”restriction” depends on how homogenous agents
are within the experimentally-assigned groups and to what extent the experiment can block
friendship between agents from different groups. Expectedly, when agents assigned to the
same experimental group are quite homogenous and exchanging friendship signals across
let us further suppose that the peer selection decision is binary in the sense that an agent either sends a
friendship signal to another or does not send a friendship signal to another. In such a smoking game, each
agent has 2N−1 = 29 possible peer selection decisions and 2 possible smoking decisions, so the size of the entire
joint decision space is [2× (29)]10. This expression is a number greater than the total population on the earth.
Therefore, even if the economist observes peer selection decisions, these decisions are expected to distribute
very sparsely in the decision space, i.e., the curse of dimensionality emerges. As a consequence, estimation of
the peer selection decision jointly across agents requires an extremely large number of repeated observations
on a reference group.
If a researcher knows a priori that the equilibrium will definitely not be established over some subspaces of
the entire possible decision space, then the data requirement is less demanding. However, it is hard to obtain
this knowledge. In fact, Add Health does not have the peer selection decision recorded; what Add Health
records is realizations of equilibrium friendship probabilities.
2Instrumental variables may still be necessary in Krauth (2006). We note that an agent’s unobserved
heterogeneity (in the smoking equation) affects the agent’s equilibrium peer norm because it affects how the
agent makes friends with others. For example, suppose a smoker suddenly contracts asthma (unobserved
by the economist). This unobserved heterogeneity (asthma) not only makes the smoker unwilling to smoke
but also, holding all else constant, makes her unwilling to make friends with smokers in order to avoid the
utility loss due to smoking disconformity. In other words, the smoker reselects her peer smoking norm. This
example indicates that one’s equilibrium peer smoking norm is correlated with her unobserved heterogeneity
even after controlling for the correlation between her own unobserved heterogeneity and her peers’ as done in
Krauth (2006). Hence, arguably using instrumental variables to purge off correlation between the peer norm
and unobserved heterogeneity is still necessary.
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groups is costly, then peer selection is quite hindered by the experiment; one could argue
that peer selection is largely ”controlled”. However, even in this situation, an agent is still
choosing friends within group members who are similar to her. Hence, strictly speaking, even
in experiments, an agent’s peer norm is still a function of endogenous peer selection and, in
turn, correlated with the agent’s own unobserved heterogeneity affecting her peer selection.
Another strategy exploits instrumental variables that directly affect peers’ outcome of in-
terest but not the individual’s outcome to purge off the correlation between one’s peer norm
and her unobserved heterogeneity (Evans, Oates and Schwab, 1992; Gaviria and Raphael,
2001; Hoxby, 2000; Ioannides and Zabel, 2002). This strategy is not thorough because al-
though it purges off the correlation between an agent’s peers’ outcomes and the agent’s
individual unobserved heterogeneity, the agent’s peer selection decision is still correlated with
her individual unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, the agent’s instrumented peer norm
is still a variable that is conditional on endogenous friendships. Realizing this shortcoming, I
instrument an agent’s friendships as well as the agent’s peers’ smoking decisions to purge off
confounding due to peer section.
Estimating peer effects entails understanding how agents make friends with each other.
Therefore, I first present a theoretical model that endogenous outcomes of interest and friend-
ship formation (Chapter 3). In Section 4, I describe the empirical model that accounts for
endogenous peer norms (both friendship selection and peer smoking behavior) in the deci-
sion to initiate smoking. The unique data are described in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses
estimation results. Section 7 concludes with a simulated policy change.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Model
The theoretical model described below assumes that agents play a pure strategy simultaneous-
move Bayes game. The game endogenizes both the discrete peer selection decision and other
discrete decisions.1 The decision process in the game is the following. At the beginning of a
period, each agent first receives an action-dependent private shock/information. Then each
agent chooses the actions of peer selection and smoking based on public information, the
action-dependent private shock and her expectation of others’ private shock conditional upon
her individual private shock. Due to the presence of a stochastic private shock, an agent is
not able to tell what actions she should take prior to the realization of the private shock. As
such, even with full observability of public information, one can at most predict equilibrium
actions in a probability sense. The equilibrium probability distribution of actions on both
peer selection and the outcomes of interest, and hence, equilibrium friendship probabilities
among agents are completely governed by exogenous public information and a common prior.2
3.1 Peer Selection and Friendship Production
Consider a self-containing group of players Nt = {1, 2, ..., nt} in period t (t = 1, 2, ..., T ).
Nt is self-containing in the sense that every player in Nt only makes friends with a subset of
1Although my major interest is peer effects on smoking, this theoretical model is general in the sense that
it allows for peer effects in multiple endogenous dimensions (e.g., smoking, drinking, academic performance)
and multiple exogenous dimensions (e.g., family income, gender).
2Though the common prior is known to every player in the game, I do not include it as a piece of public
information consistently.
Nt. I use subscript ‘−i’ to represent all players in Nt except player i. I assume that peers are
equally important. Players in Nt are characterized by a nt×K matrix zt recording exogenous
characteristics and predetermined actions. At the decision moment in period t, zt is known
to all members in Nt.
zt =

z′1,t
.
z′i,t
.
z′nt,t

=

z1,1,t ... z1,k,t ... z1,K,t
. ... . ... .
zi,1,t ... zi,k,t ... zi,K,t
. ... . ... .
znt,1,t ... znt,k,t ... znt,K,t

where zi,t is the column vector that records individual i’s exogenous characteristics and pre-
determined actions.
At the beginning of period t, a generic player i ’s peer selection action is a nt×1 friendship
signal vector (si,t), where
si,t = [s1i,t...s
j
i,t...s
nt
i,t]
′
. If player i decides to send a friendship signal to player j ∈ Nt\{i} then sji,t = 1; otherwise
sji,t = 0. The cost associated with peer selection action si,t is reflected in player i’s budget
constraint. Let Si denote a generic player i’s peer selection action set (i.e., si,t ∈ Si). Si has
2nt−1 distinct elements corresponding to agent i’s 2nt−1 different ways of sending friendship
signals to nt − 1 other players.
Stacking s′1,t, s′2,t,...,s′i,t,...,s
′
nt,t, we obtain a nt × nt square matrix (st) that records peer
selection actions across all players in Nt. That is,
st =

s′1,t
.
s′i,t
.
s′nt,t

=

0 ... sj1,t ... s
nt
1,t
. ... . ... .
s1i,t ... 0 ... s
nt
i,t
. ... . ... .
s1nt,t ... s
j
nt,t ... 0

(3.1)
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A player does not send a friendship signal to herself; therefore, sii,t = 0 ∀i ∈ Nt.
In period t, after the peer selection decision (st), the friendship network can be depicted by
a nt × nt matrix (ζt). The network records observed friendship outcomes. A generic element
of ζt (ζ
j
i,t) is either 0 (agent i regards agent j as a peer) or 1 (agent i does not regard agent j
as a peer). Since one does not consider herself as a peer, ζii,t = 0 ∀i ∈ Nt. Because friendship
can be asymmetric, ζji,t may not equal to ζ
i
j,t. More specifically,
ζt =

ζ ′1,t
.
ζ ′i,t
.
ζ ′nt,t

=

0 ... ζj1,t ... ζ
nt
1,t
. ... . ... .
ζ1i,t ... 0 ... ζ
nt
i,t
. ... . ... .
ζntnt,t ... ζ
j
nt,t ... 0

A generic element of matrix ζt, ζ
j
i,t, is the output of the friendship network production
function ζ(.). That is,
ζji,t = ζ(s
j
i,t, s
i
j,t; zi,t, zj,t) = 1(ζ
∗(sji,t, s
i
j,t; zi,t, zj,t) ≥ ζ∗c(zi,t, zj,t)) (3.2)
where ζ∗(sji,t, s
i
j,t; zi,t, zj,t) is the latent index governing whether agent i regards agent j as a
peer. ζ∗c(zi,t, zj,t) is the friendship cutoff value that varies as characteristics of agent i and
agent j vary.
Let us assume that friendship between two agents is affected only by their friendship
signals to each other and their exogenous characteristics. Then, zl,t ∀l ∈ Nt\{i, j} and any
element in st other than s
j
i,t and s
i
j,t are not inputs of ζ(s
j
i,t, s
i
j,t; zi,t, zj,t) in equation 3.2.
Because friendship can be asymmetric, the sequencing of input arguments in function
ζ∗(.), ζ∗c(.), and ζ(.) matters. In general,
ζ∗c(zi,t, zj,t) 6= ζ∗c(zj,t, zi,t) (3.3)
ζ∗(sji,t, s
i
j,t; zi,t, zj,t) 6= ζ∗(sij,t, sji,t; zj,t, zi,t) (3.4)
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ζ(sji,t, s
i
j,t; zi,t, zj,t) 6= ζ(sij,t, sji,t; zj,t, zi,t) (3.5)
I make the following three assumptions, regarding the friendship network production func-
tion ζ(.).
Assumption 1: ∀sij,t,∀zi,t and ∀zj,t, if sji,t = 0 then ζji,t = 0.
This assumption states that if agent i does not send a friendship signal to agent j then
for sure agent i does not regard individual j as a peer no matter what peer selection decision
is made by agent j and what characteristics these two agents have.
Assumption 2: If ζji,t = 1 then s
i
j,t = 1.
This assumption states that a necessary condition for agent i to regard agent j as a peer
is that agent j sends a friendship signal to agent i. This is consistent with the intuition that
an agent does not regard another agent as a friend if the latter agent does not even spend
some time or other resources on the former.
Assumption 3: ∀sji,t,∀zi,t and ∀zj,t, ζ∗(sji,t; sij,t = 1, zi,t, zj,t) ≥ ζ∗(sji,t; sij,t = 0; zi,t, zj,t).
This assumption states that given agent i’s peer selection decision and agent i and agent
j’s exogenous characteristics, if agent j sends a friendship signal to agent i, the latent index
value of ‘agent i nominates agent j as a friend’ increases.
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 jointly imply the following:
ζji,t = 1⇒ sji,t = 1 and sij,t = 1.
This says, consider any two generic agents, as long as one of them regards the other as a peer
then these two agents have exchanged friendship signals.
The number of agents regarded by agent i as friends in period t is
∑
j∈Nt\{i}
ζji,t.
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3.2 Decisions Other Than Peer Selection
Together with the peer selection action, player i also chooses M other actions (m =
1, 2, ....,M) summarized in a M × 1 column vector as below:
ai,t = [ a1i,t a
2
i,t ... a
m
i,t ... a
M
i,t
]′.
Let Ai denote the decision set of the mth (m = 1, 2, ...,M) action for all players, i.e., ami,t ∈ Ai.
Ai has Jm categories. For example, if Ai is the smoking action set and the smoking action is
binary, then Ai = {0, 1} and J1 = 2.
Let column vector di,t = [s′i,t a
′
i,t]
′ denote an arbitrary decision on both peer selection and
the M other choices made by player i at the beginning of period t ; Let Di ≡ Si ×
M∏
m=1
Ai be
the corresponding decision set; i.e., di,t ∈ Di. Di has NDi = 2nt−1
M∏
m=1
Jm elements. Di is the
collection of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive decisions player i can choose from
at decision moment t. Since any two different players, say player i and player j, choose peers
from two different peer choice sets, then, Si 6= Sj and in turn, Di 6= Dj . However, ∀i ∈ Nt,
Si has 2nt−1 elements, so I define ND = NDi ∀i ∈ Nt.
Let ai,t = [ a1i,t a
2
i,t ... a
m
i,t ... a
M
i,t
]′ denote player i’s M × 1 peer norm vector in
period t. We note player i’s peer norm is determined by both her peer selection decision (si,t)
and other nt − 1 players’ M decisions other than peer selection. An element of ai,t can be
expressed as below:
ami,t = χ(ζ(st, zt), a
m
−i,t) =
∑
j∈Nt\{i}
ζji,ta
m
j,t∑
j∈Nt\{i}
ζji,t
(3.6)
Next, I lay out the main elements of this game.
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3.3 Preference
Suppose player i knows all other nt−1 players actions d−i,t = [d1,t, ...di−1,t, di+1,t, ...dnt,t] ∈
D−i, (D−i ≡
∏
j∈Nt\{i}
Dj) at decision moment t, then she solves the following single-agent
utility maximization problem:
max
di,t
M∑
m=1
um(ami,t; zi,t) + 1[
∑
j∈Nt\{i}
ζji,t > 0]
M∑
m=1
upm(|ami,t − ami,t|; zi,t) (3.7)
s.t. C(di,t; d−i,t, zi,t)− yi,t ≤ 0
where um(ami,t; zi,t) captures the payoff associated with the m
th action (m = 1, ...,M)
other than peer selection. If player i regards at least one person as a friend, then she receives
an additional component of utility. upm(|ami,t − ami,t|; zi,t) is the peer influence utility derived
from the mth action (m = 1, ...,M) other than peer selection given that player i regards
one or more people as friend(s). |ami,t − ami,t| is player i’s deviation from the mth peer norm.
Player i may maximize her payoff by choosing to not regard anyone as a friend. If so, then
1[
∑
j∈Nt\{i}
ζji,t > 0] = 0. Price variables are contained in zi,t. yi,t is per-period income. (yi,t is
also an element of zi,t.) C(di,t; d−i,t, zt) represents the cost of decision di,t conditional upon
other players decisions d−i,t. The presence of d−i,t in player i’s budget constraint reflects
Manski’s (1995) point that social interaction could work through not only preferences (utility
function) but also the budget constraint. For example, suppose Jack dislikes Tom. Compared
with the case where Jack does not try to make friends with Mary, it probably becomes more
financially expensive for Tom to make friends with Mary if Jack tries to make friends with
Mary too.
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3.4 Information Structure
At the beginning of period t, nt players collectively receive a (action-dependent) nt ×ND
private shock (private information) matrix εt. That is,
εt =

ε
′
i,t
.
ε
′
i,t
.
ε
′
nt,t

=

ε1i,t .... ε
h
i,t .... ε
ND
i,t
. ... . ... .
ε1i,t .... ε
h
i,t .... ε
ND
i,t
. ... . ... ...
ε1nt,t .... ε
h
nt,t .... ε
ND
nt,t

nt×ND
h = 1, 2, ...., ND
where εhi,t is player i’s private shock if she chooses the h
th decision from her decision choice set
Di. Column vector εi,t = [ ε1i,t .... ε
h
i,t .... ε
ND
i,t
]′ is player i’s private shock vector, which
is not revealed to any player j 6= i at the decision moment. In a Bayes game framework, εi,t
represents ”player type”. The distribution of private shocks, f(εi,t), is known by every player
in the game. Therefore, f(εi,t) is the common prior. Let f−i|i(ε−i,t|εi,t) denote player i’s prior
over others’ private shocks (types) conditional upon hers. Individual priors are consistent with
common prior; following Bayes’ rule, we have
f−i|i(ε−i,t|εi,t) =
f(εi,t, ε−i,t)∫
f(εi,t, ε−i,t)dε−i,t
∀i ∈ Nt (3.8)
Define
f−i|i = (f−i|i(ε−i,t|εi,t))i∈Nt
where f−i|i is the collection of individual priors consistent with the common prior.
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3.5 Allowed Decision Space
Social interactions among agents’ budget constraints implies that not only player i’s per-
sonal decision (di,t) but also her potential peers’ decisions (d−i,t) affect whether her budget
constraint is satisfied. In the game, I assume that there exists at least one nonempty subspace
of the largest possible joint decision space,
∏
i∈Nt
Di, that satisfies the following two conditions
simultaneously: (1) the subset can be expressed as a Cartesian product of all nt players’ indi-
vidual decision space; and (2) each element of the subspace satisfies all nt budget constraints.
I refer to such a subspace as an Allowed Decision Space (ADS). I characterize an ADS in
Appendix 1.
Hereafter, I abuse notation and use D =
∏
i∈Nt
Di to denote an ADS to ease the notational
burdern.
Consider an ADS, D =
∏
i∈Nt
Di, let NDi denote the number of elements in Di then there
are
∏
i∈Nt
NDi decision elements in D.
Solving the maximization problem defined in equation 3.7, we obtain action-specific payoff
functions as below:
V (di,t, d−i,t, εi,t, zt, um(.), upm(.)) =
M∑
m=1
Vm(di,t; zt d−i,t) + ε
di,t
i,t ∀dt ∈ D (3.9)
where εdi,ti,t is player i’s action-dependent private shock.
Let It denote the public information at decision moment t, such that
It = {zt, V (.), ζ(.)} ∈ ϑpub.
3.6 Bayes Game and Pure Strategy Bayes Nash Equilibrium
(PSBNE)
At decision moment t, the following fundamentals govern the nt players’ decisions:
• Players: Nt = {1, 2, ..i.., nt}
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• Public information: It = {zt, V (.), ζ(.)} ∈ ϑpub
• Private shock set (player type space) : E =
∏
i∈Nt
Ei
• Priors: f−i|i = (f−i|i(ε−i,t|εi,t))i∈Nt
• an ADS: D
In essence, nt players make decisions in the following Bayes game (Gt) where
Gt =
〈
Nt, E, f−i|i, D, It
〉
.
A player’s strategy profile (di,t(It, εi,t)) is a correspondence between (both public and private)
information and the individual decision
di,t(It, εi,t) : ϑpub × Ei 7−→ Di
At a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to alter her strategy as long as other players
do not.
Therefore, a PSBNE is a collection of nt mappings from the information set to the decision
set, i.e.,
(d∗i,t(It, εi,t))i∈Nt where d
∗
i,t(.) : ϑpub × Ei 7−→ Di
such that
d∗i,t(It, εi,t) ∈ arg max
di,t∈Di
∫
ε−i,t∈E−i
V (di,t, (d
∗
j,t)j∈Nt\{i})f−i|i(ε−i,t|εi,t)dε−i,t
∀i ∈ N t and ∀{It, εi,t} ∈ ϑpub×Ei
(3.10)
where
Di =
⋃
εi,t∈Ei
d∗i,t(It, εi,t),
f−i|i(ε−i,t|εi,t) is individual priors consistent with a common prior restricted to Ei, and
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f−i|i(ε−i,t|εi,t) =
f (εi,t,ε−i,t)∫
f (εi,t,ε−i,t)dε−i,t
and f(.) is the joint density function of private shocks
restricted to E ,
i.e., f (εt) =
f(εt)∫
1(εt∈E)f(εt)dεt
.
Let us define d∗(.) : ϑpub × E 7−→ D
d∗((It, εi,t)i∈Nt) ≡ (d∗i,t(It, εi,t))i∈Nt
By stacking equation 3.10 over all players in Nt, the right hand side of equation 3.10 can be
written as a function Ψ(.) : D∗ 7→ D∗. We get
d∗((It, εi,t)i∈Nt) = Ψ(d
∗((It, εi,t)i∈Nt); It, Nt, f−i|i) ∀{It, εi,t} ∈ ϑpub × Ei (3.11)
According to equation 3.11, a PSBNE d∗((It, εi,t)i∈Nt) is a fixed point of function Ψ. Accord-
ing to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, such a PSBNE exists.
3.7 Equilibrium Decision Probabilities
Due to the random realization of private information, an exact prediction of whether a
player makes a specific decision or not is impossible; however, one can predict the equilibrium
decision probabilities based on public information. In this subsection, I characterize the
decision probabilities at a PSBNE.
Let the set pi∗i denote the collection of equilibrium probabilities corresponding to equilib-
rium decision elements in Di.
Let the function pi∗i (.) : D
∗
i 7−→ pi∗i denote the correspondence between equilibrium decision
elements and their probabilities. Then
pi∗i (d
∗) =
∫
εi,t
1(d∗i,t(It, εi,t) = d
∗)fεi,t(εi,t)dεi,t ∀i ∈ Nt,∀d
∗ ∈ Di
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where fεi,t(εi,t) is the marginal density function of εi,t; that is
fεi,t(εi,t) =
∫
ε−i,t∈E−i
f(εi,t, ε−i,t)dε−i,t
and 1[.] is an indicator function where
1[d∗i,t(It, εi,t) = d
∗] =
 1 if d
∗
i,t(It, εi,t) = d
∗
0 otherwise.
We note that the following equation holds:
∑
d∗∈Di
pi∗i (d
∗) = 1 ∀i ∈ Nt.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Strategy
In the presence of peer effects, schoolmates are playing a game. This implies that the
ideal approach is to estimate all schoolmates’ actions on peer selection and smoking jointly.
Doing so means that the economist should regard a cross section of peer selection actions
and smoking actions made by all schoolmates as a single observation. The analysis sample
(sample 1 in Table 5.1) only contains 124 schools, therefore, I could not implement this
ideal approach.1 Another data limitation is that I do not observe students’ peer selection
actions in Add Health; I only observe the friendship outcomes. Given these data limitations,
I have chosen to estimate smoking peer effects in a single agent style in the sense that I
estimate agents’ smoking actions agent by agent rather than jointly across all agents in a
reference group (i.e., a school in this study). In addition, my empirical strategy should avoid
estimating peer selection actions and smoking actions jointly within an agent because I do
not observe peer selection actions.
In what follows, I first derive an (structural form) empirical specification that is consistent
with the theoretical model and is implementable under the data limitations mentioned above.
In addition, I discuss identification concerns in the empirical specification. I also explain how
to instrument endogenous peer smoking norms using two separate reduced-form analyses in
sequence. Next, I explain how to estimate the structural form empirical specification in two
stages. The first stage involves instrumenting the peer norm flexibly through three flexible
(reduced-form) steps sequentially to control for endogeneity bias caused by both peer selection
1Implementing this ideal approach means that I only have 124 observations.
and smoking decision simultaneity. The second stage estimates the structural form empirical
specification for smoking initiation using the instrumented peer norm.
4.1 Derivation of Empirical Specification and Identification
I assume players only choose a smoking action and a peer selection action in the smoking
game. Hence, a generic player’s decision is di = [ai si]′ where ai is the smoking action and si
is the peer selection action. At a PSBNE, a generic player i expects that others players adopt
the equilibrium strategy d∗−i(.). Therefore, I parameterize player i’s decision-specific payoff
(equation 3.9) as follows:
V ([ai si]′, d∗−i(ε−i, I), εi, z, usmoke(.))
= usmoke(di; z, d∗−i) + ε
di
i
= zβ(ai; I)− δai − γ
∣∣ai − a−i(si; z, d∗−i)∣∣+ εdii
(4.1)
where
(1) d∗−i(ε−i, I) is other players’ equilibrium decisions.
(2) z is all players’ exogenous characteristics in the game; z =
 z′i
z′−i

(3) δ is the biological smoking disutility;
(4) β(ai; I) is the parameter vector corresponding to z. According to equation 3.9, β(ai; I)
is smoking–action-dependent;
(5) γ > 0 is the smoking peer effects parameter. The larger the γ, the heavier the
punishment for deviation from peer smoking norm;
(6) a−i(si; z, d∗−i) is player i’s peer smoking norm when she takes peer selection action si.
a−i(si; z, d∗−i) is a function of si reflecting that player i chooses her peer smoking norm;
(7)
∣∣ai − a−i(si; z, d∗−i)∣∣ > 0 is player i’s deviation from peer smoking norm; if she smokes
then
∣∣ai − a−i(si; z, d∗−i)∣∣ = 1−a−i(si; z, d∗−i); otherwise, ∣∣ai − a−i(si; z, d∗−i)∣∣ = a−i(si; z, d∗−i).
I do not observe students’ peer selection actions (si) in Add Health. To proceed with
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estimation, I first derive player i’s ex post expected smoking-action-specific payoff based on
equation 4.1 below.2
Player i’s ex post expected smoking-action-specific payoff is
EV (εi, I, F (.); ai)
=Max
si
zβ(ai; I)− δai − γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ai −
∫
ε−i|εi
a−i(si; z, d∗−i)dF (ε−i|εi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ εdii

= zβ(ai; I)− δai − γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ai −
∫
ε−i|εi
a−i(si; z, d∗−i)dF (ε−i|εi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ε[ai s
∗
i (ai)]
′
i
(4.2)
where s∗i (ai) = argmax
si
zβ(ai; I)− δai − γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ai −
∫
ε−i|εi
a−i(si; z, d∗−i)dF (ε−i|εi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ε[ai s
∗
i (ai)]
′
i
.
We note that if ai is player i’s smoking action at PSBNE, then s∗i (ai) is her equilibrium peer
selection action.
Substituting equation 3.6 and equation 4.1 into equation 4.2 yields
EV (εi, I, F (.); ai)
= zβ(ai; I)− δai − γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ai −
∫
ε−i|εi
∑
j∈Nt\{i}
ζji (s
j∗
i (ai), s
i∗
j , zi, zj)a
∗
j (εj , I)∑
j∈Nt\{i}
ζji (s
j∗
i (ai), s
i∗
j , zi, zj)a
∗
j (εj , I)
dF (ε−i|εi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ ε[ai s
∗
i (ai)]
′
i .
(4.3)
Defining the ex post expected peer smoking norm as E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.)), we have
E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.)) =
∫
ε−i|εi
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ(s∗i (εi, I), s
∗
j (εj , I); I)a
∗
j (εj , I)∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ(s∗i (εi, I), s
∗
−i(ε−i, I); I)
dF (ε−i|εi)
E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.)) ∈ [0, 1].
(4.4)
2ex post means after the realization of private shock (εi); ex ante means prior to the realization of private
shock (εi).
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Then player i’s ex post expected smoking-action-specific payoff is
EV (εi, I, F (.); ai) = zβ(ai; I)− δai − γ
∣∣∣ai − E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))∣∣∣+ εaii (4.5)
where,
∣∣∣ai − E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))∣∣∣ > 0 is the deviation from the ex post expected peer smoking
norm; if player i smokes then
∣∣∣ai − E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))∣∣∣ = 1 − E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.)); otherwise,∣∣∣ai − E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))∣∣∣ = E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.)).
We note even if the number of players in the game is modestly large (say 50 players),
estimating parameters related to exogenous terms containing z−i is hard because there is a
large number of different combinations between zj and zj′ (j ∈ N\{i} and j′ ∈ N\{i}) and
between zi and z−i. As such, I focus on the component of zβ(ai; I), which is purely related
to zi. To do so, I assume that zβ(ai; I) can be decomposed as
zβ(ai; I) = ziβself (ai; I) + f(zi, z−i)βinteract(ai; I) (4.6)
where βself (ai; I) is the parameter vector corresponding to player i’s exogenous characteristics
zi; f(zi, z−i) collects the terms containing some or all elements in z−i; βinteract(ai; I) is the
parameter vector corresponding to z−i. Let us define
υaii (I) ≡ f(zi, z−i)βinteract(ai; I). (4.7)
We note that υaii (I) is smoking-action-specific because βinteract(ai; I) is smoking-action-specific.
Substituting equation 4.6 and equation 4.7 into equation 4.5, we get the smoking-action-
specific ex post expected payoff as below
EV (εi, I, F (.); ai) = ziβself (ai; I)− δai − γ
∣∣∣ai − E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))∣∣∣+ εaii + υaii (I) (4.8)
Next, I can define a player’s ex post expected payoff differential (∆EV (εi, I, F (.))) between
smoking and not smoking. It is this differential that governs a player’s smoking action. That
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is,
∆EV (εi, I, F (.)) ≡ EV (εi, I, F (.); ai = 1)− EV (εi, I, F (.); ai = 0) (4.9)
A player’s smoking decision is
a∗1,i = 1(∆EV (εi, I, F (.)) > 0).
Substituting equation 4.8 into equation 4.9, we have
∆EV (εi, I, F (.)) = −γ − δ + zi[βself (ai = 1; I)− βself (ai = 0; I)]+
2γE(a∗−i |εiI, F (.)) + ε1i − ε0i + υ1i (I)− υ0i (I).
(4.10)
The constant term ”−γ−δ” in the equation above is collinear with the intercept; therefore, the
biological smoking disutility parameter (δ) cannot be identified separately from the intercept.
Without loss of generality, I can rewrite the equation above as
∆EV (εi, I, F (.)) = zi[βself (ai = 1; I)− βself (ai = 0; I)]+
2γE(a∗−i |εi,I, F (.)) + ε1i − ε0i + υ1i (I)− υ0i (I).
(4.11)
The economist does not have full observability on public information (I). Let us decompose
I = [Io Iu]; zi is a component of I, so, correspondingly, zi = [zo zu]; superscript ”o” means
observed by the economist and superscript ”u” means unobserved by the economist. In the
game, common prior F (.), Iu, and private shocks are unobserved by the economist. Define
∆βself ≡ βself (ai = 1; I)− βself (ai = 0; I)
∆εi ≡ ε1i − ε0i
∆υi(I) ≡ υ1i (I)− υ0i (I)
(4.12)
Assume that zi∆βself can be decomposed as
zi∆βself = zoi∆β
o
self + z
u
i ∆β
u
self .
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Then ∆EV (εi, I, F (.)) can be rewritten into
∆EV (εi, I, F (.)) = zoi∆β
o
self + 2γE(a
∗
−i |εi, I, F (.)) + ∆εi +∆υi(I) + zui ∆βuself . (4.13)
The economist does not know private shock εi, therefore, she cannot use the private-shock-
specific ex post expected equilibrium peer norm (i.e., E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))) in equation 4.13) as
a predictor of smoking initiation. In order to proceed with estimation, she can, alternatively,
use the ex ante equilibrium peer norm to proxy E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.)) because she can recover the
ex ante equilibrium peer norm from the data. Player i’s ex ante equilibrium peer norm is
E(a∗−i |I, F (.)) =
∫
E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))dFεi(εi). (4.14)
Define
τ(εi, I, F (.)) = 2γ[E(a∗−i |εi, I, F (.))− E(a∗−i |I, F (.))]. (4.15)
Substituting equation 4.15 into equation 4.13, we get
∆EV (εi, I, F (.)) = zoi∆β
o
self + 2γE(a
∗
−i |I, F (.))
+ ∆εi +∆υi(I) + zui ∆β
u
self + τ(εi, I, F (.)).
(4.16)
An identification concern regarding the peer effect (γ) arises if correlation exists between
E(a∗−i |I, F (.)) and either of the four unobserved components: ∆εi, ∆υi(I), zui∆βuself , and
τ(εi, I, F (.)). We note zui ∆β
u
self is innocuous because z
o
i ⊥ zui . Meanwhile, we can draw the
following three conclusions:
(1) unobserved heterogeneity is expected to be correlated across players due to two reasons.
First, E(∆υi(I),∆υj(I)) 6= 0 and E(τ(εi, I, F (.)), τ(εj , I, F (.))) 6= 0 in general; second, if
private shocks are correlated then E(∆εi,∆εj) 6= 0.
(2) correlation between E(a∗−i |I, F (.)) and ∆υi(I) is expected because both of them are
functions of public information (I);
(3) correlation between E(a∗−i |I, F (.)) and τ(εi, I, F (.)) is expected because both of them
are functions of public information (I) and the common prior (F (.)).
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My interest is to examine peer effects on smoking among schoolmates; therefore, it is rea-
sonable to assume that school-level unobservables account for the correlation of unobserved
heterogeneity across students attending the same school. As such, I decompose a student’s un-
observables into two components; one is school-level unobservables and the other is individual
unobservables. The final empirical specification is:
∆EVi,s = Xi,sα+ γÊ(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I) + µs + εi,s
a∗i,s = 1(∆EVi,s > 0); E(a
∗
−i,s) ∈ [0, 1]
(4.17)
where
(1) s indexes schools;
(2) i indexes students; i ∈ Ns = {1, 2, ..., ns}
(3) Xi,s is student i’s observed exogenous characteristics;
(4) α is the parameter vector corresponding to Xi,s;
(5) γ is the peer effect parameter;3
E(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I) is student i’s ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norm; it is a function of
public information and the function form of the common prior;
µs is the school-level unobserved heterogeneity; this term allows for students’ unobserv-
ables to be correlated at school level, µs = ∆υi(I);
εi,s is the individual unobserved heterogeneity;
a∗i,s is observed equilibrium smoking action;
E(µs, µs′) = 0, E(εi,s, εj,s) = 0, E(εi,s, εj,s′) = 0, and E(µs, εi,s) = 0.
4.2 Estimation
In this subsection, I discuss estimation of the empirical specification in equation 4.17.
The identification concern is that E(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I) may be correlated with (school-level and/or
individual) unobserved heterogeneity. To address this concern, in the first stage of estimation,
3Compared with equation 4.16, I drop ”2” in front of γ for simplicity. This simplification rescales the peer
effect estimate and is innocuous.
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I predict the ex ante equilibrium peer norm (E(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I)) using instrumental variables
that affect an agent’s peer smoking norm and are uncorrelated with the agent’s unobserved
heterogeneity (εi,s). I also use school fixed effects to futher control for the potential correlation
between the instrumented peer norm and school-level unobserved heterogeneity (µs) in the
second stage of estimation.
Before further discussion, let us first examine the functional form of the ex ante equi-
librium peer smoking norm (E(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I)). Substituting equation 3.6 into equation 4.14
yields the reduced form representation of E(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I) in equation 4.18 below. Apparently,
exogenous inputs (I and F (.)) of the game affect the ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norm
nonlinearly and interactively.4 We further note that the peer smoking norm is affected by ex
post equilibrium friendships (ζ∗(εi, εj , I)) and ex post equilibrium potential peers’ smoking
4To see this through an example, let us think of a 2-agent smoking Bayes game with peer effects. For
simplicity, let us assume (1) there is no peer selection decision in this game (two agents are assigned as friends
by nature), (2) the latent smoking behavioral outcome process can be specified additively and linearly based
on observed public information. (3) unobserved heterogeneity specified in the behavioral specification of this
game follows an i.i.d. logistic distribution across agents. Consequently, this game has the following behavioral
form {
pi1 =
exp(X1β+γpi2)
1+exp(X1β+γpi2)
pi2 =
exp(X2β+γpi1)
1+exp(X2β+γpi1)
where pi1 and pi2 are equilibrium smoking probabilities for agent 1 and agent 2, respectively. X1 and X2
are public information which have direct impact on the first agent’s smoking decision and the second agent’s
smoking decision, respectively. γ is peer effect behavioral parameter.
Solving for pi1and pi2 in terms of exogenous characteristics, we can get a reduced form representation as{
pi1 = R(X1, X2)
pi2 = R(X2, X1)
where, R is the reduced form representation. In this example, R(.) cannot be solved in a closed form.
We note, X2 enters the first agent’s reduced form solution and X1 enters the second agent’s reduced form
solution. In addition, X1 and X2 enter R(.) nonlinearly and interactively even if they affect the latent outcome
in a linear and additive pattern in the behavioral outcome process.
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actions (a∗j (εj , I)).
E(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I) =
∫
εi
∫
ε−i|εi
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ(s∗i (εi, I), s
∗
j (εj , I); I)a
∗
j (εj , I)∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ(s∗i (εi, I), s
∗
−i(ε−i, I); I)
dF (ε−i|εi)dF (εi)
=
∫
ε
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ(s∗i (εi, I), s
∗
j (εj , I); I)a
∗
j (εj , I)∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ(s∗i (εi, I), s
∗
−i(ε−i, I); I)
dF (ε)
=
∫
ε
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ∗(εi, εj , I)a∗j (εj , I)∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ζ∗(εi, εj , I)
dF (ε) (4.18)
The economist is unable to recover the ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norm based on
the two ex post quantities (ζ∗(εi, εj , I) and a∗j (εj , I)) because she does not observe private
shocks. To proceed with estimation, the economist can construct an estimate of a student’s
(say, student i attends school s) ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norm based on the stu-
dent’s ex ante equilibrium friendship probabilities (p(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1) ∀j ∈ Ns\{i}) and her
schoolmates’ ex ante smoking probabilities (p(a∗j (I;F (.)) = 1) ∀j ∈ Ns\{i}) because both
of them can be recovered from the data. As such, I predict a student’s ex ante equilibrium
peer smoking norm in three sequential steps.5 In a school (say school s), I first instrument
all students’ ex ante equilibrium smoking probabilities (p(a∗i (I;F (.)) = 1) ∀i ∈ Ns); next, I
instrument all students’ ex ante equilibrium friendship probabilities (p(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1)
ns
i=1
∀j ∈ Ns\{i} and ∀i ∈ Ns ); in the third step, I construct a student’s instrumented ex ante
equilibrium peer smoking norm (Ê(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I)) from her schoolmates’ instrumented ex ante
equilibrium smoking probabilities (p̂(a∗j (I;F (.)) = 1) ∀j ∈ Ns\{i}) and her instrumented ex
5Instrumenting the ex ante equilibrium peer norms in three steps increases the flexibility and in turn the
goodness of fit. In practice, it is difficult to instrument the ex ante equilibrium peer norms in one step because
it is difficult to specify appropriate interaction terms. It turns out that even when I instrument the ex ante
equilibrium peer norms in three steps, the interaction terms involved are fairly complicated.
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ante friendship probabilities (p̂(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1) ∀j ∈ Ns\{i}) according to equation 4.19:
Ê(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I) =
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
[
p̂(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1)× p̂(a∗j (I;F (.)) = 1)
]
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
p̂(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1)
∀j ∈ Ns\{i} and ∀i ∈ Ns
(4.19)
where, Ê(a∗−i ;F (.), I) is student i’s instrumented ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norm;
p(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1) is the ex ante equilibrium probability that student i regards student j
as a friend;
p̂(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1) is the instrumented ex ante equilibrium probability that student i
regards student j as a friend;
p(a∗j (I;F (.)) = 1) is schoolmate j’s ex ante equilibrium smoking probability;
p̂(a∗j (I;F (.)) = 1) is schoolmate j’s instrumented ex ante equilibrium smoking probability.
To obtain instrumented ex ante equilibrium individual smoking probabilities in the first step, I
use a bagged tree classifier which is, in essence, an ensemble of 100 fully-grown tree classifiers
created from 100 bootstrap samples (Breiman 1996).6 The bagged tree classifier includes
the following exogenous characteristics as explanatory variables: grade level, race, gender,
age, parental smoking, the highest education of parents, family income, and state cigarette
tax. We note that these variables directly affect a student’s schoolmates’ ex ante smoking
probabilities (p(a∗j (I;F (.)) = 1)), and in turn, the student’s ex ante equilibrium peer smoking
norm but should be uncorrelated with the student’s individual unobserved heterogeneity (i.e.,
µs in equation 4.17).7
To implement the second step, I use a flexibly specified logit model to predict ex ante equi-
6In this study, a logit model does not perform well when even only a few interaction terms are added.
A quasi-perfect separation problem emerges and logit estimation cannot proceed. Interaction terms causing
the quasi-perfect separation problem are covariates that explain outcomes so well that in one realization (one
wave of Add health) variations in binary smoking actions within categories defined by those interaction terms
disappear. Thus, the quasi-perfect separation problem is a drawback with the logit model specification. This
concern further motivates me to use the bagged tree classifier.
7The predicted smoking probability for a student may still be correlated with school-level unobserved
heterogeneity (µs). I will come back to this concern soon.
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librium friendship probabilities (p(ζj∗i (I;F (.)) = 1)). Three reasons motivate me to adopt a
logit model rather than a bagged tree classifier in this second step. First, I have a large num-
ber of pairwise observations (2, 987, 761 pairs) where each student is paired with every student
in her school; therefore, the quasi-perfect separation problem that plagues the logit model
when the sample size is small (N = 17, 844 in the first step) disappears. Second, conformity
theory (Bernheim, 1994) provides guidance for specifying a logit model, so this step is less
”data mining” oriented than the first step. Third, the large number of pairwise observations
makes the computational cost in a bagged tree classifier overly expensive. To be specific, I use
student i’s directional deviations from a generic schoolmate j in gender, race, age, grade level,
family income, parental smoking, and parents’ highest education as explanatory variables for
student i’s friendship with the generic schoolmate j.8 I also use the instrumented ex ante
equilibrium individual smoking probabilities from the first step to create directional devia-
tions in smoking. It is worth mentioning that because the instrumented ex ante equilibrium
individual smoking probabilities from the first step are functions of exogenous characteristics
such as whether the students’ parents smoke or not, a student’s created directional smoking
deviations using the instrumented smoking probabilities should be uncorrelated with her own
error term in the friendship logit model.
Besides these directional deviations, school size is also used as an explanatory variable
in the friendship logit model due to the following two considerations. First, as school size
increases, the probability that an arbitrary pair of schoolmates run into each other, and
become friends, decreases. Second, school size may affect competition (e.g., competition for
teachers’ attention) among teens, and hence, friendship formation.
After modeling ex ante equilibrium individual smoking probabilities and ex ante equi-
librium friendship probabilities, I then construct the instrumented ex ante equilibrium peer
smoking norm according to equation 4.19 as the third step.
8To illustrate direction deviations, let us consider directional deviation in a categorical variable, say, gender,
between two agents, say, Tom and Mary. Tom’s directional deviation from Mary in gender is ”male-to-female”
and Mary’s directional deviation from Tom in gender is ”female-to-male”; ”male-to-female” is not equal to
”female-to-male”. Friendship between two agents may not be symmetric; this is the reason why I use directional
deviations as instrumental variables.
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As mentioned above, one’s schoolmates’ parental characteristics are used to explain her
ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norm. Schoolmates’ parents also choose schools for their
children. Consequently, the instrumented ex ante equilibrium peer norms could be corre-
lated with school-level unobserved heterogeneity (µs). To address this concern, I control for
school-level unobserved heterogeneity by including school fixed effects in the second stage of
estimation.
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Chapter 5
Data
The theoretical model indicates that an agent’s friendships directly affect her peer norm.
Therefore, to estimate peer effects, the economist should observe an agent’s friends in the
data.1 Regarding this data requirement, The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
Health (Add Health) is a suitable dataset because it provides detailed information on some
respondents’ friendships within their attending schools. Currently, Add Health has three
waves of in-home surveys fielded in 1995, 1996, and 2001. I only use the wave I in-home
survey data collected between April 1995 and December 1995 because the other two waves
lack state cigarette tax information from the survey year and the state identifiers are not
released even in the restricted-use version of the data. The wave I in-home survey sample
contains 20, 745 nationally representative 7th-12th graders from 145 schools nationwide.
Among the 145 schools, there are 16 schools in which all students are included in the
survey sample and almost every student is asked to nominate five schoolmate friends of each
gender.2 Among the remaining schools, respondents are randomly selected from a gender-
grade stratum within each school and some of the respondents are also asked to nominate five
schoolmate friends of each gender.3 After deleting respondents with missing values, I obtain
1Observing agents’ peer selection actions is unnecessary if the economist does not intend to estimate the
peer selection action and smoking action jointly. In fact, as explained before, even if the economist observes
agents’ peer selection actions for a couple of periods, estimating peer selection and smoking jointly is typically
infeasible due to the high dimensionality of a peer selection action.
If the economist cannot observe the friendship network in the data, then the economist has to subjectively
assign friends to an agent. For example, the economist may assign all of a student’s classmates as the student’s
peers. The drawback of doing so is obvious because, in general, a student is not a friend of all her classmates.
2Due to administrative error, a small fraction (<5%) of students in those schools were asked to nominate
one friend of each gender.
3When respondents are randomly selected from a school, even if a student is asked to nominate all her
17, 844 students (Sample 4 in Table 5.1). Among the 17,844 students, there are 5, 774 students
(Sample 4.1) who were asked to nominate five schoolmate friends of each gender.4 To model
friendship formation, I create 2, 987, 761 pairwise observations from the 5, 774 students and
their corresponding schoolmates. Consider a created pairwise observation corresponding to a
generic student i in the 5, 774 students and one of her schoolmates (say, schoolmate j). The
pairwise observation records whether i regards j as a friend or not and student i’s directional
deviations from schoolmate j in terms of their exogenous characteristics that affect their peer
selection actions. In the section of empirical strategy, I explained the construction of these
pairwise directional deviations and estimation of friendship formation in more detail.
Regarding questions related to smoking behavior, Add Health asked respondents ”During
the past 30 days, on how many days did you smoke cigarettes?”. Based on this question,
I dichotomize the smoking decision. I classify respondents who reported smoking cigarettes
one or more days during the last 30 days prior to the wave I in-home survey date as smok-
ers; otherwise, they are nonsmokers. The literature suggests that lagged smoking behavior
schoolmate friends the recorded (within-school) friendship network contains missing information. It can be
shown that in a very large school, if the sampling rate is r, then the percentage of missing friendship network
information is close to 1− r2.
Let N by N zero-diagonal matrix, ζpop, denote the true friendship network among the N individuals in the
population of interest. We note, only N2 − N non-diagonal elements in ζpop matter. The random sample
contains N × r respondents. Let ζsample denote the recorded friendship network in the survey sample. Then,
[(N × r)2 − (N × r)] non-diagonal elements in ζsample matter.
Hence, the number of missing (friendship network) elements in the survey is N2−N− [(N×r)2− (N×r)] =
N2(1− r2)−N(1− r) and the corresponding rate of missing information, Rmissing, is then
Rmissing =
N2(1− r2)−N(1− r)
(N2 −N)
=
N(1− r2)− (1− r)
(N − 1)
As N approaches infinity, we have
lim
N→+∞
Rmissing = lim
N→+∞
N(1− r2)− (1− r)
(N − 1)
= 1− r2
4Ideally, the economist would like to have a dataset in which she can track down all of a respondent’s
friends (not only schoolmate friends but also non-schoolmate friends). However, no such data set exists to my
knowledge.
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affects an agent’s current smoking decision through nicotine tolerance and dependence that
alter current period utility (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Bullock et al., 1994; Stolerman and
Jarvis, 1995). Without knowledge of a respondent’s state of residence, I am unable to find
an instrumental variable to control for the endogeneity of lagged smoking behavior (e.g.,
lagged cigarette prices/taxes). Realizing this data limitation, I restrict the analysis sample
to respondents who had no regular smoking history before the wave I in-home survey. More
specifically, respondents who answered ”yes” to ”Have you ever smoked cigarettes regularly,
that is, at least 1 cigarette every day for 30 days?” in the wave 1 in-home survey are excluded
from the analysis. Hence, this selection applies only to the analysis of the smoking initiation
decision. The full sample of respondents from each school with complete data (sample 4 of
Table 5.1) is used in the analysis of friendship formation and construction of the peer smoking
norm. Table 5.1 details derivation of the sample used in estimation.
Add Health provides a rich set of measurements on respondents’s characteristics. For my
purposes, the following measurements are of particular interest due to their potential impact
on smoking. They are gender, age, race, grade, religious orientation, family income, parental
smoking behavior and highest education of parents. All the 13, 924 respondents in sample 4.2
of Table 5.1 have no smoking history. About 12% of the 13, 924 initiated smoking in wave I.
Table 5.2 lists the summary statistics for this sample. Figure 5.1 (created from Sample 4 in
Table 5.1) presents the relationship between individual smoking and peer smoking. As the
number of smoker friends among the three closest friends increases from 0 to 3, the individual
smoking rate increases from about 10% to about 70%, indicating a strong positive correlation
between personal smoking and peer smoking.
Figure 5.2 (created from sample 1 in Table 5.1) presents the distribution of the number
of schoolmate friends. 72.81% of respondents (15,103 out of 20,745) in Add Health wave I
in-home survey had at least one schoolmate friend. On average, a respondent had 1.76 friends.
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Table 5.1: Sample Derivation
Sample number and selection criterion Sample size
1. wave I respondent 20,745
2. with at least one parent 19,903
3. has measurements on family income 18,245
4. with complete state cigarette tax information 17,844
4.1. asked to nominate 5 schoolmate friends of each gender 5,7741
4.2. never smoking regularly before wave I 13,9242
1 Using the 5,774 observations, I generate 2,987,761 directional pairwise observations to model friendship
formation.
2 Both sample 4.1 and sample 4.2 are subsets of sample 4.
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics (N = 1, 3924)
Variables Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max
Smoking initiation 0.117(0.003) 0 1
State Cig. Tax (in 10 cents) 3.240(1.595) 0.25 7.5
No. of Smoking Parents
0 0.384(0.004) 0 1
1 0.250(0.004) 0 1
2 0.367(0.004) 0 1
Highest Parents’ Education
College 0.334(0.004) 0 1
High school 0.499(0.004) 0 1
Less than high School 0.167(0.003) 0 1
Family Income by grade (in 10K dollars) 3.455(4.857) 0 99.9
Grade Level
7 0.149(0.356) 0 1
8 0.139(0.346) 0 1
9 0.179(0.383) 0 1
10 0.194(0.396) 0 1
11 0.180(0.384) 0 1
12 0.158(0.364) 0 1
Age 16.028(1.729) 12 21
Female 0.504(0.500) 0 1
Race
White 0.582(0.493) 0 1
Black 0.266(0.442) 0 1
Asian 0.076(0.265) 0 1
Other 0.076(0.265) 0 1
Religion
Not Religious 0.148(0.335) 0 1
Unimportant 0.056(0.229) 0 1
Important 0.340(0.474) 0 1
Very important 0.457(0.498) 0 1
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Figure 5.1: Individual Smoking vs. Peer Smoking
36
Figure 5.2: Number of Schoolmate Friends
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Chapter 6
Results
6.1 Estimation of Instrumented ex ante Equilibrium Smoking
Probabilities
The distribution of instrumented ex ante equilibrium smoking probabilities from the
bagged tree classifier is shown in Figure 6.1. We can see that the median of the instrumented
smoking probabilities among smokers (0.7024) is much larger than that among nonsmokers
(0.0268). This is an indication that the bagged tree classifier does a good job in differentiat-
ing between smokers and nonsmokers. I further examine the performance of the bagged tree
classifier in comparison with a flexibly specified logit model based on two widely accepted
diagnostic tests: the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve and the reliability diagram
(Jolliffe and Stephenson 2003).1 Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 compares the performance of the
flexibly specified logit model and the bagged (n=100) tree classifier in terms of ROC and
reliability, respectively. We can see clearly that in Figure 6.2, the area under the ROC curve
of smoking probabilities obtained from the bagged tree classifier are much larger than that
of smoking probabilities obtained from the flexibly specified logit model. This indicates that
the fit in the bagged tree classifier is better than that in the logit model.
Figure 6.3 compares the bagged tree classifier and the flexibly specified logit model in terms
of reliability.2 We can see that the dots in the bagged tree classifier panel are clustering around
1The logit model includes the same exogenous explanatory variables as in the bagged tree. I manually
added interactions terms into the logit model. The logit model already has quasi-perfect separation problem,
so it already reaches the limit of flexibility in logit framework.
2For a dot (x, y) in Figure 6.3, y is the average smoking rate of students falling into an estimated smoking
the 45 degree line in Figure 6.3 over the whole range of the estimated smoking probabilities.
For the logit model, an apparent problem is that the maximum estimated smoking probability
is less than 0.75. This suggests that the flexibly specified logit model underestimates the
individual smoking probability because sample 4 (see Table 5.1) includes many students with
previous smoking histories whose smoking probabilities should be close to 1.
6.2 Estimation of Friendship Probabilities
Table 6.1 presents coefficient estimates of the directional friendship logit model. We can
see as school size increases friendship probability drops.3 This finding is consistent with
the intuition that as school size increases a student’s probability of making friends with an
arbitrary schoolmate drops holding others constant. Conformities in grade, gender, age,
and race contribute to friendship significantly. Income conformity does not contribute to
friendship except for friendships among teens from low income families. As we can see in
Table 6.1, directional smoking deviations are significant predictors for friendships. This is
consistent with the theoretical implication that smoking actions and peer selection actions
are interdependent. Figure 6.4 presents the reliability diagram of the estimated directional
friendship probabilities. We can see that dots are closely clustering along the 45 degree line
over the whole range indicating that the logit model performs well.
6.3 Estimation of the Structural Smoking Initiation Probabil-
ities
With the instrumented ex ante equilibrium smoking probabilities and the instrumented
ex ante equilibrium directional probabilities in hand, I then construct the instrumented ex
probability bin. y is calculated from observed data. x is the center of the estimated smoking probability bin.
If estimation is good, we should expect x to be close to y. Therefore, dots should cluster closely to a 45 degree
line.
3To achieve a higher degree of goodness of fit, I include the square of school size as an explanatory variable.
If I do not include these square terms, the coefficient estimates of all the first order terms are negative values
and are statistically significant.
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ante equilibrium peer smoking norms based on equation 4.19. Figure 6.5 presents the scatter
plot of the instrumented ex ante equilibrium individual smoking probabilities and the con-
structed instrumented ex ante equilibrium peer norms; the thick line is the trend curve fitted
through a polynomial (up to the 9th order) regression. Apparently, the instrumented ex ante
equilibrium individual smoking probabilities are positively correlated with the instrumented
ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norms.
For comparison purposes, I present in Table 6.2 the coefficient estimates from six different
specifications of the smoking initiation probability. Each Specification differently controls for
the peer smoking norm. The corresponding marginal effect estimates are presented in Table
6.3. The first specification (no peer effects) does not include peer effects. Specification 1 as-
sumes that peer influence does not exist. It controls for school-level unobserved heterogeneity
by using school fixed effects. Specification 2 and Specification 3 model peer influence by using
school norms as explanatory variables (Norton, 1998 and Lundborg, 2006). If the economist
does not have detailed friendship network data on hand but knows the respondents’ school
memberships, then the economist may run Specification 2 and Specification 3 to capture peer
influence. It is worth mentioning that both Specification 2 and Specification 3 implicitly as-
sume that everyone is everyone else’s friend within a school and such a friendship composition
is exogenously assigned but not chosen by students. Specification 2 uses observed smoking
actions to construct school-level peer norms.4 peer Specification 3 uses instrumented ex ante
equilibrium smoking probabilities. Specification 4, Specification 5 and Specification 6 exploit
the detailed peer composition information in Add Health in modeling peer influence. They
differ in their efforts to correct for bias caused by the endogenous peer norms. In Specifica-
tion 4, the peer norms are constructed based on observed friendships and observed smoking
actions. In Specification 5, the peer norms are constructed based on observed friendships
and instrumented ex ante equilibrium smoking probabilities. Therefore, both Specification
4 and Specification 5 fail to control for endogenous friendships. Specification 5 differs from
Specification 4 in that it controls for the endogenous smoking action while the latter does
4I am able to construct such school-level peer norms using the Add Health data that provides smoking
behavior of all students in a school. However, those data are typically unavailable. Rather, researchers use
reported school-level smoking average to represent peer smoking norms.
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not. Some people did not nominate any schoolmate as a friend, therefore, in Specification 4
and Specification 5, only 4,268 out of the 13,924 observations can be used in analysis because
for those students who did not nominate any schoolmate as a friend, the peer norms are
undefined. Specification 6 is the preferred model because it controls for both the endogenous
friendships and the endogenous smoking actions.
An obvious pattern in Table 6.3 is that the grade effect differs dramatically across different
model specifications. Before further discussion on the interpretation of coefficients on grade
levels, let us first examine what grade level really measures. Recall that all observations in
the analysis samples (either N=13,924 or N=4,268) are free of smoking history. Therefore,
a respondent’s grade level is, in fact, perfectly collinear with the respondent’s left censored
survival time when we interpret smoking initiation as the event of interest. The starting point
of the left censored survival time can be arbitrarily set to a time prior to entering grade 7
depending on research convenience. A person’s left censored survival time is a function of the
person’s (observed and unobserved) smoking initiation deterrents in the past. Hence, it is
reasonable to infer that grade level is positively correlated with the strength of the unobserved
(by the economist) smoking initiation deterrents in the past. Those unobserved deterrents
in the past may be correlated with unobserved smoking initiation deterrents in the present.
As such, coefficient estimates on grade levels should be interpreted with the following two
cautions. First, they reflect the effects of past unobserved smoking initiation deterrents on
smoking initiation in the present. Second, they are biased if serial correlation exists between
past unobserved smoking deterrents and present unobserved smoking deterrents. Expectedly,
the more the time-invariant deterrents on smoking initiation are controlled, the less severe
is the bias. As explained, grade level is perfectly collinear with the left censored survival
time. Hence, we should expect that a marginal change in grade level from 7 to a higher grade
level causes a larger percentage drop in the smoking initiation rate, holding other covariates
constant, because it is reasonable to believe that teens who managed to abstain from smoking
a longer period in the past probably are less likely to initiate smoking in the present. From
Table 6.3, we see that estimation results in Specification 4, 5 and 6 are consistent with
such an expectation. In all these three specifications, as grade level increases (from grade
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7), the predicted smoking initiation rate drops significantly. However, estimation results in
Specification 1, 2 and 3 are inconsistent with such an expected pattern. For example, in
Specification 1 (no peer effects), changing all teens from those who survive smoking initiation
up to at least grade 7 into teens who survive smoking initiation up to at least grade 8, the
smoking initiation rate increases by 3.30 (1.22) percentage points.
Comparing Specification 2, 3 and 6 in Table 6.3, we can see that peer influence estimated
in Specification 2 (0.18 (0.03)) and Specification 3 (0.16 (0.03)) are much smaller than that
that in Specification 6 (1.07 (0.09)). This is expected because it is reasonable to believe that
a person’s chosen friends influence the person more heavily than the person’s schoolmates.
Comparing Specification 4, 5 and 6 in Table 6.3, we see a pattern that peer influence
estimates in the former two specifications (0.11 (0.01) and 0.19 (0.04), respectively) are much
smaller than that in Specification 6 (1.07 (0.09)). Recall that it is a person’s expected peer
norm rather than the person’s friends’ average smoking actions that enters the econometric
representation of the outcome process (equation 4.17). For a person who chooses a finite
number of friends at a decision moment, these two quantities, in general, are different. More
specifically, the person’s expected peer norm is the expectation of her friends’ average smoking
actions. The smaller the number of friends a person has at equilibrium, the larger the variation
of the person’s friends average smoking actions should be. From an econometric perspective,
using a person’s friends’ average smoking actions as an explanatory variable in Specification 4
and 5, in essence, adds a measurement error onto her expected peer norm.5 Since an average
respondent in Add Health has only 1.76 friends, the variances of the measurement errors
among the 4,268 respondents in Specification 4 and 5 are considerably large. This explains
why when compared with Specification 6, the peer effect estimate in Specification 4 and 5 are
smaller.6
5The variance of this measurement error is not only affected by the number of friends a person has (as just
mentioned) but also by the distribution of equilibrium smoking probabilities among her friends. To see this
point, consider a person whose friends’ smoking probabilities are all 0s (or 1s), then the measurement error
vanishes even if the person has only 1 friend.
6The author notices that Specification 4 and 5 use an analysis sample different than that used in Specification
6. This difference may explain the smaller peer influence estimates in Specification 4 and 5. To investigate this
possibility, the author checked the smoking rate (12.4%) in the analysis sample used in Specification 4 and 5
and that (11.7%) used in Specification 6 and found that they are very close. Therefore, the author believes
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The preferred model (Specification 6) shows that peer influence is large and significant. A
one percentage point increase in the peer norm causes the smoking initiation rate to increase
by 1.07 (0.10) percentage points. All other models that use poorly constructed norms as
explanatory variables underestimate peer influence. These models underestimate the peer
effect 5 to 10 fold with marginal effects ranging from 0.11 to 0.19 percentage points. It should
be cautioned that Specification 6 itself cannot provide useful policy implications related to
the peer norm because it is typically impossible for policy makers to exogenously assign peer
norms to teens because teens choose their friends after all. I will discuss how to do policy
simulation based on both the smoking equation and the friendship formation equation below.
Estimation results suggest that peer influence amplifies the direct tax deterrent effect on
smoking initiation. In Specification 1 (no peer effect), we can see that the overall marginal
tax effect is -3.86 (1.81). This implies that if the cigarette tax increases by 10 cents, then the
smoking initiation rate for those individuals who had no smoking history will drop by 3.86
(1.81) percentage points. After controlling for peer influences, we see the overall marginal tax
effect decreases to -3.68 (2.29). Though the magnitude of the mean marginal effect only drops
0.18 percentage points, the standard error increases quite a lot pulling down the statistical
significance from the 3% to 10% level. This differential in tax effect implies that the social
multiplier effect amplifies the tax deterrent effect in the field because the tax effect estimated
in Specification 1 is the combination of the direct tax effect estimated in Specification 6 and
a social multiplier tax effect.
In specification 1 (no peer effects), compared to white teens with a smoking initiation
rate of 13.76 (0.43) percentage, black teens are less likely to initiate smoking by 4.86 (0.81)
percentage points. However, in Specification 6 (preferred model), after taking peer influence
into account, being black increases an individual’s smoking probability by 7.01 (1.55) percent-
age points. This finding indicates that friendship sorting based on racial conformity explains
why black teens have a lower smoking rate than white teens. In specification 1, compared
to having parents who have college education, having parents who have only a high school
that the differences in the analysis sample do not explain why the peer influence estimate in Specification 6 is
larger than those in Specification 4 and 5.
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education, the teen’s smoking probability is increased by 1.25 (0.60) percentage points, and
having parents who have an education level less than high school, the teen smoking proba-
bility is increased by 1.69 (0.82) percentage points In both specification 1 and specification
6, we can see that family does not matter too much. For 8th to 12th graders, family income
effect was insignificant. For 7th graders in Specification 1, family income has a statistically
significant effect, but is still trivial in a practical sense (-0.59 (0.23) percentage points).
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of Estimated Smoking Probabilities(from bagged tree)
45
Figure 6.2: ROC Comparison Bagged Tree vs. Logit
46
Figure 6.3: Reliability Comparison: Bagged Tree vs. Logit
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Figure 6.4: Reliability: Logit Directional Friendship
Table 6.1: Friendship logit model (N=2,987,761 created from 5,774 students)
Explanatory Variable Coefficient (std err)
School size
School size (<= 100) 0.065(8.44e-3)***
School size square -5.76e-4(7.17e-5)***
School size (100 <size<= 200) 0.030(3.73e-3)***
School size square (100 <size<= 200) -1.41e-4(1.45e-5)***
School size square(> 200) 2.83e-3(5.52e-4)***
School size square (> 200) -1.91e-6(2.72e-7)
Grade deviation .
7-upper grader -1.872(0.149)***
8-8 2.50e-2(0.106)***
8-upper graders -1.460(0.178)***
8-lower graders -1.791(0.169)***
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.1 continued
Explanatory Variable Coefficient (std err)
9-9 -0.414(0.151)***
9-upper graders -1.951(0.162)***
9-lower graders -1.252(0.267)***
10-10 -0.525(0.149)***
10-upper graders -1.814(0.155)***
10-lower graders -1.985(0.174)***
11-11 -0.477(0.149)***
11-upper graders -1.708(0.160)***
11-lower graders -1.872(0.159)***
12-12 -0.472(0.150)***
12-lower graders -1.980(0.163)***
Gender deviation
Male-female -0.320(0.027)***
Female-male -0.381(0.037)***
Female-female 0.107(0.031)***
Age deviation
Nonnegative age deviation (age<= 14) -0.484(0.141)***
Negative age deviation (age<= 14) -0.457(0.057)***
Nonnegative age deviation (14 <age<= 17) -0.407(0.038)***
Negative age deviation (14 <age<=17) -0.350(0.024)***
Nonnegative age deviation (age> 17) -0.417(0.031)***
Negative age deviation (age> 17) -0.283(0.064)***
Racial deviation
White-Black -1.842(0.130)***
White-Asian -1.399(0.111)***
White-Other races -0.357(0.076)***
Black-White -1.957(0.165)***
Black-Black 0.107(0.064)*
Black-Asian -2.850(0.251)***
Black-Other races -2.000(0.209)***
Asian-White -1.420(0.153)***
Asian-Black -3.118(0.239)***
Asian-Asian 0.589(0.066)***
Asian-Other races -1.507(0.129)***
Other races-White -0.389(0.081)***
Other races-Black -1.916(0.206)***
Other races-Asian -1.238(0.161)***
Other races-Other races 2.31e-2(8.82e-2)
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.1 continued
Explanatory Variable Coefficient (std err)
Family income deviation
Nonnegative income deviation (self income<= 25K) -7.29e-2(3.75e-2)***
Negative income deviation (self income<= 25K) -2.62e-2(7.80e-3)
Nonnegative income deviation (25K<self income<= 50K) -3.67e-3(1.17e-3)
Negative income deviation (25K<self income<= 50K) 3.22e-3(5.86e-3)
Nonnegative income deviation (50K<self income75K) -1.02e-2(9.50e-3)
Negative income deviation (50K<self income<= 75K) -2.62e-3(7.92e-3)
Nonnegative income deviation (self income> 75K) -4.52e-3(4.16e-3)
Negative income deviation (self income> 75K) 1.32e-3(8.77e-3)
IV smoking probability deviation
Magnitude of IV smoking probability deviation (deviation > 0) -0.641(0.115)***
Magnitude of IV smoking probability deviation (deviation < 0) -0.297(0.096)***
Note: ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level
50
Figure 6.5: Trend Plot: IV individual Smoking Probability vs. IV Peer Smoking Norm
51
T
a
b
le
6
.2
:
S
m
o
k
in
g
In
it
ia
ti
o
n
L
o
g
it
M
o
d
el
S
ix
D
iff
er
en
t
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
S
p
ec
.1
S
p
ec
.2
S
p
ec
.3
S
p
ec
.4
S
p
ec
.5
S
p
ec
.6
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
(N
=
4
,2
6
8
)
(N
=
4
,2
6
8
)
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
N
o
p
ee
r
eff
ec
t
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
IV
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
,b
P
ee
r
n
o
rm
IV
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
c
P
re
fe
rr
ed
b
S
m
o
k
in
g
N
o
rm
(u
n
it
is
0
.0
1
)
7
N
A
1
.7
5
0
(0
.8
8
9
)*
1
.5
4
1
(1
.0
0
4
)
1
.1
6
3
(0
.3
7
3
)*
*
*
3
.1
5
0
(1
.2
5
4
)*
*
*
1
2
.9
3
2
(1
.6
9
9
)*
*
*
8
N
A
-0
.2
0
6
(0
.8
2
2
)
-0
.7
6
1
(0
.9
4
8
)
0
.9
1
5
(0
.3
1
5
)*
*
*
1
.1
4
4
(0
.8
2
1
)
9
.6
8
4
(1
.4
2
4
)*
*
*
9
N
A
1
.7
2
6
(0
.5
9
1
)*
*
*
2
.0
0
2
(0
.6
0
9
)*
*
*
1
.4
8
3
(0
.3
1
5
)*
*
*
1
5
7
7
(0
.6
9
5
)*
*
1
0
.1
4
5
(1
.0
9
6
)*
*
*
1
0
N
A
1
.8
4
9
(0
.6
1
8
)*
*
*
1
.7
4
(0
.5
7
2
)*
*
*
1
.2
8
9
(0
.2
6
8
)*
*
*
2
.5
8
9
(0
.6
3
4
)*
*
*
1
0
.4
8
5
(1
.1
1
1
)*
*
*
1
1
N
A
1
.7
8
0
(0
.6
2
4
)*
*
*
1
.5
1
9
(0
.5
9
9
)*
*
*
0
.7
9
7
(0
.2
6
3
)*
*
*
1
.1
9
4
(0
.5
5
6
)*
*
9
.1
7
9
(0
.9
2
4
)*
*
*
1
2
N
A
3
.4
5
0
(0
.6
9
1
)*
*
*
2
.8
6
1
(0
.5
7
7
)*
*
*
1
.0
9
1
(0
.2
9
1
)*
*
*
1
.8
1
7
(0
.6
5
4
)*
*
*
1
0
.6
7
6
(1
.0
0
1
)*
*
*
S
ta
te
C
ig
.
T
a
x
b
y
G
ra
d
e(
u
n
it
in
1
0
ce
n
ts
)
7
-0
.6
2
0
(0
.2
4
8
)*
*
*
-0
.1
1
5
(4
.6
1
e-
2
)*
*
-0
.1
1
1
(4
.6
1
e-
2
)*
*
-0
.9
3
9
(0
.5
4
6
)*
-0
.8
7
4
(0
.5
2
8
)
-0
.5
0
5
(0
.3
2
8
)*
8
-0
.5
3
2
(0
.2
4
6
)*
*
-1
.7
7
e-
2
(4
.3
1
e-
2
)
-1
.5
7
e-
2
(4
.3
2
e-
2
)
-0
.8
9
1
(0
.5
4
4
)*
-0
.8
4
1
(0
.5
2
4
)
-0
.4
7
8
(0
.3
2
1
)
9
-.
5
0
9
(0
.2
4
4
)*
*
-0
.1
1
3
(3
.7
7
e-
2
)*
*
*
-0
.1
1
2
(3
.7
7
e-
2
)*
*
*
-0
.6
7
4
(0
.5
3
7
)
-0
.5
9
8
(0
.5
1
7
)
-0
.4
5
6
(0
.3
1
3
)
1
0
-0
.3
9
2
(0
.2
4
3
)*
-3
.7
4
e-
3
(3
.7
1
e-
2
)
-3
.4
3
e-
3
(3
.7
1
e-
2
)
-0
.4
8
9
(0
.5
3
5
)
-0
.4
1
6
(0
.5
1
6
)
-0
.4
1
4
(0
.3
1
4
)
1
1
-0
.4
0
7
(0
.2
4
3
)*
-2
.6
8
e-
2
(3
.8
6
e-
2
)
-2
.7
5
e-
2
(3
.8
6
e-
2
)
-0
.5
5
2
(0
.5
3
5
)
-0
.4
9
3
(0
.5
1
6
)
-0
.4
4
8
(0
.3
1
4
)
1
2
-0
.3
6
1
(0
.2
4
5
)
4
.1
3
e-
2
(4
.3
0
e-
2
)
3
.8
6
e-
2
(4
.3
0
e-
2
)
-0
.5
2
6
(0
.5
3
4
)
-0
.4
5
4
(0
.5
1
5
)
-0
.5
0
9
(0
.3
1
4
)*
N
o
.
o
f
S
m
o
k
in
g
P
a
re
n
ts
(c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
:0
)
1
0
.2
6
0
(0
.0
7
1
)*
*
*
0
.2
5
9
(0
.0
7
1
)*
*
*
0
.2
5
8
(0
.0
7
2
)*
*
*
0
.3
4
7
(0
.1
3
0
)*
*
0
.3
7
0
(0
.1
2
8
)*
*
*
0
.2
5
5
(0
.0
7
4
)*
*
*
2
0
.3
4
2
(0
.0
6
5
)*
*
*
0
.3
4
3
(0
.0
6
4
)*
*
*
0
.3
4
7
(0
.0
6
8
)*
*
*
0
.3
7
3
(0
.1
2
5
)*
*
*
0
.3
9
7
(0
.1
2
3
)*
*
*
0
.2
9
8
(0
.0
6
8
)*
*
*
F
a
m
il
y
In
co
m
e
b
y
G
ra
d
e(
u
n
it
in
1
0
K
d
o
ll
a
rs
)
7
-7
.2
1
e-
2
(2
.8
0
e-
2
)*
*
*
-7
.6
8
e-
2
(2
.7
4
e-
2
)*
*
*
-7
.8
2
e-
2
(2
.7
5
e-
2
)*
*
*
-4
.6
3
e-
2
(4
.8
0
e-
2
)
-0
.8
7
4
(0
.5
2
8
)*
-5
.8
0
e-
2
(2
.8
2
e-
2
)*
*
8
1
.1
1
e-
3
(1
.3
9
e-
2
)
4
.7
4
e-
4
(1
.3
3
e-
2
)
1
.1
2
e-
3
(1
.3
3
e-
2
)
1
.2
9
e-
2
(1
.8
0
e-
2
)
-0
.8
4
1
(0
.5
2
5
)*
6
.5
7
e-
3
(1
.4
5
e-
2
)
9
6
.6
7
e-
3
(1
.5
2
e-
2
)
9
.7
5
e-
3
(1
.4
6
e-
2
)
8
.9
0
e-
3
(1
.4
7
e-
2
)
-1
.8
4
e-
2
(3
.5
3
e-
2
)
-0
.5
9
8
(0
.5
1
7
)
1
.2
8
e-
2
(1
.8
9
e-
2
)
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
..
.
52
..
.
ta
bl
e
6
.2
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
N
o
p
ee
r
eff
ec
t
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
IV
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
,b
P
ee
r
n
o
rm
IV
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
c
P
re
fe
rr
ed
b
1
0
-2
.4
1
e-
3
(9
.9
9
e-
3
)
-1
.5
5
e-
3
(9
.5
5
e-
3
)
-1
.4
1
e-
3
(9
.4
9
e-
3
)
-1
.8
4
e-
2
(3
.5
3
e-
2
)
-0
.4
1
6
(0
.5
1
6
)
-1
.3
5
e-
3
(1
.2
7
e-
2
)
1
1
1
.2
6
e-
3
(1
.1
1
e-
2
)
1
.6
9
e-
2
(1
.0
9
e-
2
)
1
.7
3
e-
2
(1
.0
9
e-
2
)
-2
.4
5
e-
2
(2
.1
2
e-
2
)
-0
.4
9
3
(0
.5
1
6
)
6
.3
9
e-
3
(1
.3
0
e-
2
)
1
2
1
.8
1
e-
2
(1
.3
2
e-
2
)
1
.7
9
e-
2
(1
.3
0
e-
2
)
1
.8
1
e-
2
(1
.2
8
e-
2
)
1
.6
7
e-
2
(1
.0
2
e-
2
)
-0
.4
5
4
(0
.5
1
5
)
9
.0
5
e-
3
(1
.5
8
e-
2
)
H
ig
h
es
t
P
a
re
n
ts
’
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
(c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
:
co
ll
eg
e)
H
ig
h
S
ch
l
0
.1
2
7
(0
.0
6
1
)*
0
.1
1
5
(0
.0
6
1
)*
0
.1
1
5
(0
.0
6
1
)*
0
.2
6
8
(0
.1
1
3
)*
*
0
.2
7
8
(0
.1
1
2
)*
*
0
.1
2
9
(0
.0
6
3
)*
*
<
H
ig
h
S
ch
l
0
.1
6
9
(0
.0
8
0
)*
0
.1
5
8
(.
0
7
9
)*
*
0
.1
5
5
(0
.0
7
9
)*
*
0
.2
5
4
(0
.1
4
8
)*
0
.2
6
2
(0
.1
4
7
)*
0
.1
8
5
(0
.0
8
3
)*
*
R
a
ce
B
la
ck
-0
.5
1
0
(0
.0
9
1
)*
*
*
-0
.3
9
9
(0
.0
7
5
)*
*
*
-0
.3
9
1
(0
.0
7
6
)*
*
*
-0
.7
2
5
(0
.1
9
3
)*
*
*
-0
.6
3
1
(0
.1
9
5
)*
*
0
.6
2
1
(0
.1
2
4
)*
*
*
A
si
a
n
-0
.5
2
9
(0
.1
3
8
)*
*
*
-0
.4
0
7
(0
.1
2
5
)*
*
*
-0
.4
0
5
(0
.1
2
7
)*
*
*
-0
.5
2
2
(0
.2
3
0
)*
*
-0
.5
2
6
(0
.2
2
8
)*
*
-0
.1
6
8
(0
.1
3
8
)
O
th
er
R
a
ce
s
-0
.0
9
2
(0
.1
1
5
)
-0
.0
1
4
(0
.1
0
6
)*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
(0
.1
0
7
)
-0
.4
3
2
(0
.2
3
6
)
-0
.4
5
8
(0
.2
2
3
)
0
.0
7
4
(0
.1
1
9
)
F
em
a
le
0
.0
5
2
(0
.0
5
5
)
0
.0
4
5
(0
.0
5
4
)
0
.0
4
6
(0
.0
5
4
)
-2
.6
1
e-
2
(0
.1
0
1
)
-4
.4
2
e-
2
(0
.1
0
0
)
0
.0
2
8
(0
.0
5
6
)
A
g
e
0
.0
7
4
(0
.0
4
1
)*
0
.0
6
6
(0
.0
4
0
)*
0
.0
6
3
(0
.0
3
8
)*
0
.1
7
1
(8
..
2
1
e-
2
)*
0
.1
3
9
(0
.0
7
9
)*
9
.9
3
e-
3
(0
.0
4
3
)
G
ra
d
e(
co
m
p
a
ri
so
n
:7
)
8
-0
.2
1
4
(0
.2
3
5
)
0
.1
5
6
(0
.3
1
6
)
-0
.0
5
7
(0
.2
7
6
)
-8
.8
0
e-
2
(0
.4
8
0
)
2
.8
2
e-
2
(0
.4
9
1
)
-0
.1
9
0
(0
.2
8
3
)
9
-0
.5
8
1
(0
.3
1
9
)*
-0
.2
3
4
(0
.3
3
0
)
-0
.3
3
0
(0
.2
9
8
)
-1
.3
5
0
(0
.6
5
4
)*
*
-1
.2
8
5
(0
.6
6
7
)
-0
.9
2
2
(0
.3
9
3
)*
*
1
0
-1
.0
3
0
(0
.3
4
1
)*
*
*
-0
.6
5
0
(0
.3
4
8
)*
-6
.3
9
3
(0
.3
0
1
)*
*
-2
.0
7
3
(0
.6
7
9
)*
*
*
-2
.3
2
8
(0
.6
8
5
)*
*
*
-1
.2
0
1
(0
.4
4
7
)*
*
*
1
1
-0
.9
7
9
(0
.3
5
8
)*
*
*
-0
.5
6
4
(0
.3
6
1
)
-0
.5
2
1
(0
.3
1
7
)*
-1
.9
5
3
(0
.7
1
3
)*
*
*
-1
.9
5
3
(0
.7
1
4
)*
-0
.9
7
1
(0
.4
5
8
)*
*
1
2
-1
.3
7
7
(0
.3
8
2
)*
*
*
-1
.5
1
7
(.
4
0
8
)*
*
*
-1
.2
5
2
(0
.3
6
3
)*
*
*
-2
.2
6
3
(0
.7
7
6
)*
*
*
-2
.3
7
2
(0
.7
7
7
)*
*
-1
.2
6
1
(0
.4
7
1
)*
*
*
R
el
ig
io
n
(c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
:t
ex
tr
m
n
o
t
re
li
g
io
u
s
a
t
a
ll
)
U
n
im
p
.
0
.2
3
0
(0
.1
1
7
)*
0
.2
1
5
(0
.1
1
5
)*
0
.2
1
0
(0
.1
1
8
)*
0
.4
3
5
(0
.2
1
9
)*
*
0
.3
6
1
(0
.2
1
7
)*
0
.2
1
0
(0
.1
2
3
)*
Im
p
.
-8
.4
5
e-
3
(0
.0
8
0
)
-0
.0
1
5
(0
.0
7
7
)
-0
.0
2
0
(0
.0
7
9
)
0
.1
4
4
(0
.1
5
5
)
0
.1
1
2
(0
.1
5
4
)
-0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
8
3
)
V
er
y
im
p
.
-0
.3
8
9
(0
.0
8
4
)*
*
*
-0
.3
9
3
(0
.0
8
0
)*
*
*
-0
.4
0
2
(0
.0
8
1
)*
*
*
-0
.1
9
1
(0
.1
6
5
)
-0
.2
0
8
(0
.1
6
3
)
-0
.3
8
2
(0
.0
8
6
)*
*
*
∗∗
∗ i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
;
∗∗
5
%
le
v
el
;
∗ 1
0
%
le
v
el
a
In
th
is
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
,
I
d
o
n
o
t
u
se
sc
h
o
o
l
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
b
ec
a
u
se
th
e
se
t
o
f
sc
h
o
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
s
is
p
er
fe
ct
ly
co
ll
in
ea
r
w
it
h
(I
V
)
sc
h
o
o
l
n
o
rm
s.
b
In
th
is
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
,
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
5
,0
0
0
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
s.
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
..
.
53
..
.
ta
bl
e
6
.2
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
N
o
p
ee
r
eff
ec
t
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
IV
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
,b
P
ee
r
n
o
rm
IV
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
c
P
re
fe
rr
ed
b
c
In
th
is
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
,
I
co
u
ld
n
o
t
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
.
D
u
e
to
sm
a
ll
sa
m
p
le
si
ze
(N
=
4
,2
6
8
)
a
n
d
th
e
la
rg
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
sc
h
o
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
s,
q
u
a
si
-p
er
fe
ct
se
p
a
ra
ti
o
n
p
ro
b
le
m
a
p
p
ea
rs
in
a
lm
o
st
ev
er
y
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
sa
m
p
le
s.
54
T
a
b
le
6
.3
:
M
a
rg
in
a
l
E
ff
ec
ts
o
n
S
m
o
k
in
g
In
it
ia
ti
o
n
R
a
te
S
ix
D
iff
er
en
t
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
sa
,b
,c
,d
,e
,f
S
p
ec
.1
S
p
ec
.2
S
p
ec
.3
S
p
ec
.4
S
p
ec
.5
S
p
ec
.6
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
(N
=
4
,2
6
8
)
(N
=
4
,2
6
8
)
(N
=
1
3
,9
2
4
)
N
o
p
ee
r
eff
ec
t
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
IV
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
,b
P
ee
r
n
o
rm
IV
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
c
P
re
fe
rr
ed
b
S
m
o
k
in
g
N
o
rm
(u
n
it
is
0
.0
1
)
P
ee
r
E
ff
ec
t
N
A
0
.1
8
(0
.0
3
)*
*
*
0
.1
6
(0
.0
3
)*
*
*
0
.1
1
(0
.0
1
)*
*
*
0
.1
9
(
0
.0
4
)*
*
*
1
.0
7
(0
.0
9
)*
*
*
N
A
1
1
.7
8
(0
.2
7
)
1
1
.7
9
(0
.2
7
)
1
3
.4
7
(0
.5
1
)
1
3
.6
8
(1
.4
1
)
1
2
.1
0
(0
.2
8
)
7
N
A
0
.1
5
(0
.0
7
)*
*
0
.1
3
(0
.0
9
)
0
.1
1
(0
.0
3
)*
*
*
0
.3
0
(0
.1
2
)*
*
1
.1
2
(0
.1
6
)*
*
*
N
A
9
.3
5
(0
.6
4
)
9
.3
6
(0
.6
4
)
1
2
.6
1
(1
.4
5
)
1
2
.6
1
(1
.4
4
)
9
.7
8
(0
.6
4
)
8
N
A
-0
.0
2
(0
.0
9
)
-0
.0
8
(0
.1
1
)
0
.1
1
(0
.0
4
)*
*
*
0
.1
4
(0
.1
0
)
1
.0
7
(0
.1
6
)*
*
*
N
A
1
2
.7
0
(0
.7
6
)
1
2
.7
2
(0
.7
5
)
1
6
.7
8
(1
.5
7
)
1
6
.8
7
(1
.6
0
)
1
3
.1
9
(0
.7
4
)
9
N
A
0
.1
8
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
0
.2
1
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
0
.1
6
(0
.0
3
)*
*
*
0
.1
8
(0
.0
8
)*
*
1
.0
8
(0
.1
2
)*
*
*
N
A
1
2
.2
2
(0
.6
5
)
1
2
.2
3
(0
.6
6
)
1
4
.6
4
(1
.3
4
)
1
4
.6
8
(1
.3
4
)
1
2
.5
1
(0
.6
5
)
1
0
N
A
0
.1
9
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
0
.1
8
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
0
.1
2
(0
.0
3
)*
*
*
0
.2
5
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
1
.1
1
(0
.1
2
)*
*
*
N
A
1
1
.8
7
(0
.6
1
)
1
1
.8
6
(0
.6
1
)
1
2
.2
6
(1
.0
2
)
1
2
.2
4
(1
.0
2
)
1
2
.1
1
(0
.6
2
)
1
1
N
A
0
.2
0
(0
.0
7
)*
*
*
0
.1
7
(0
.0
7
)*
*
0
.0
8
(0
.0
3
)*
*
*
0
.1
2
(0
.0
6
)*
*
1
.0
2
(0
.1
1
)*
*
*
N
A
1
2
.8
4
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.8
6
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.8
5
(1
.0
6
)
1
2
.8
3
(1
.0
7
)
1
3
.0
7
(0
.6
7
)
1
2
N
A
0
.3
5
(0
.0
7
)*
*
*
0
.2
8
(0
.0
7
)*
*
*
0
.1
1
(0
.0
3
)*
*
*
0
.1
9
(0
.0
7
)*
*
*
1
.0
6
(0
.1
1
)*
*
*
N
A
1
1
.4
9
(0
.6
8
)
1
1
.4
9
(0
.6
8
)
1
3
.1
0
(1
.2
3
)
1
3
.1
5
(1
.2
4
)
1
1
.6
9
(0
.6
6
)
S
ta
te
C
ig
.
T
a
x
-3
.8
6
(1
.8
1
)*
*
-0
.3
5
(0
.1
7
)*
*
-0
.3
5
(0
.1
7
)*
*
-4
.7
0
(3
.8
2
)
-4
.2
7
(3
.9
3
)
-3
.6
8
(2
.2
9
)*
(u
n
it
:
1
0
ce
n
ts
)
1
2
.1
0
(0
.2
8
)
1
1
.7
8
(0
.2
7
)
1
1
.7
9
(0
.2
7
)
1
3
.4
7
(0
.5
1
)
1
3
.6
8
(1
.4
1
)
1
2
.2
2
(0
.3
2
)
B
y
g
ra
d
e
7
-4
.0
1
(1
.3
4
)*
*
*
-0
.9
1
(0
.3
5
)*
*
*
-0
.8
6
(0
.3
6
)*
*
-6
.1
6
(3
.0
7
)*
*
-5
.8
6
(3
.1
3
)*
-3
.2
4
(1
.9
3
)*
9
.7
5
(0
.6
5
)
9
.3
5
(0
.6
4
)
9
.3
6
(0
.6
4
)
1
2
.6
1
(1
.4
5
)
1
2
.6
1
(1
.4
4
)
9
.8
3
(0
.6
9
)
8
-4
.6
4
(1
.9
0
)*
*
-0
.1
9
(0
.4
7
)
-0
.1
6
(0
.4
6
)
-7
.6
8
(4
.1
1
)*
-7
.4
0
(4
.1
5
)*
-4
.0
8
(2
.5
3
)*
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
..
.
55
..
.
ta
bl
e
6
.3
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
N
o
p
ee
r
eff
ec
t
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
IV
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
,b
P
ee
r
n
o
rm
IV
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
c
P
re
fe
rr
ed
b
1
3
.1
6
(0
.7
6
)
1
2
.7
0
(0
.7
6
)
1
2
.7
2
(0
.7
5
)
1
6
.7
8
(1
.5
7
)
1
6
.8
7
(1
.6
0
)
1
3
.2
8
(0
.8
1
)
9
-4
.2
7
(1
.8
3
)*
*
-1
.1
4
(0
.3
7
)*
*
*
-1
.1
1
(0
.3
6
)*
*
*
-5
.3
2
(4
.0
7
)
-4
.8
5
(4
.2
8
)
-3
.7
4
(2
.3
9
)
1
2
.4
9
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.2
2
(0
.6
5
)
1
2
.2
3
(0
.6
6
)
1
4
.6
4
(1
.3
4
)
1
4
.6
8
(1
.3
4
)
1
2
.5
7
(0
.6
8
)
1
0
-3
.3
0
(1
.9
5
)*
-0
.0
3
(0
.3
8
)
-0
.0
2
(0
.3
8
)
-3
.3
6
(3
.9
4
)
-2
.7
4
(4
.0
2
)
-3
.3
5
(2
.4
3
)
1
2
.1
1
(0
.6
2
)
1
1
.8
7
(0
.6
1
)
1
1
.8
6
(0
.6
1
)
1
2
.2
6
(1
.0
2
)
1
2
.2
4
(1
.0
2
)
1
2
.1
6
(0
.6
4
)
1
1
-3
.6
6
(2
.0
5
)*
-0
.2
7
(0
.4
0
)
0
.3
0
(0
.4
2
)
-3
.9
8
(4
.0
2
)
-3
.5
2
(4
.0
9
)
-3
.3
5
(2
.4
3
)
1
3
.0
9
(0
.6
5
)
1
2
.8
4
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.8
6
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.8
5
(1
.0
6
)
1
2
.8
3
(1
.0
7
)
1
3
.1
4
(0
.6
9
)
1
2
-2
.9
6
(1
.9
3
)*
0
.4
1
(0
.4
4
)
0
.3
8
(0
.4
3
)
-3
.8
7
(4
.1
4
)
-3
.3
0
(4
.2
1
)
-3
.8
6
(2
.1
7
)*
1
1
.7
2
(0
.6
8
)
1
1
.4
9
(0
.6
8
)
1
1
.4
9
(0
.6
8
)
1
3
.1
0
(1
.2
3
)
1
3
.1
5
(1
.2
4
)
1
1
.7
7
(0
.6
7
)
N
o
.
S
m
k
P
a
re
n
ts
0
1
0
.1
5
(0
.4
2
)
9
.8
4
(0
.4
1
)
9
.8
3
(0
.4
2
)
1
1
.1
6
(0
.8
2
)
1
1
.0
0
(0
.8
2
)
1
0
.4
0
(0
.4
4
)
1
2
.5
2
(0
.7
1
)*
*
*
2
.5
0
(0
.6
8
)*
*
*
2
.4
9
(0
.7
0
)*
*
*
3
.4
1
(1
.2
9
)*
*
*
3
.7
3
(1
.3
1
)*
*
*
2
.4
7
(0
.7
1
)*
*
*
2
3
.4
1
(0
.6
5
)*
*
*
3
.4
1
(0
.6
4
)*
*
*
3
.4
7
(0
.6
5
)*
*
*
3
.7
1
(1
.2
5
)*
*
*
4
.0
2
(1
.2
5
)*
*
*
2
.9
3
(0
.6
7
)*
*
*
F
a
m
il
y
In
co
m
e
-0
.0
3
(0
.0
6
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
6
)
-0
.0
2
(0
.0
6
)
-0
.0
9
(
0
.1
2
)
-0
.0
9
(0
.1
2
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
7
)
(u
n
it
in
1
0
K
d
o
ll
a
rs
)
1
2
.1
0
(0
.2
8
)
1
1
.7
8
(0
.2
7
)
1
1
.7
9
(0
.2
7
)
1
3
.4
7
(0
.5
1
)
1
3
.6
8
(1
.4
1
)
1
2
.2
2
(0
.3
2
)
7
-0
.5
9
(0
.2
3
)*
*
*
-4
.4
6
(1
.2
4
)
-0
.6
3
(0
.2
2
)*
*
*
-3
.3
3
(3
.6
9
)
3
.1
0
(3
.7
2
)
-0
.4
6
(0
.2
3
)
9
.7
5
(0
.6
5
)
9
.3
5
(0
.6
4
)
9
.3
6
(0
.6
4
)
1
2
.6
1
(1
.4
5
)
1
2
.6
1
(1
.4
4
)
9
.8
3
(0
.6
9
)
8
0
.0
1
(0
.1
5
)
0
.1
4
(1
.4
7
)
0
.0
2
(0
.1
5
)
1
.6
4
(2
.2
9
)
1
.8
0
(2
.3
4
)
0
.0
7
(0
.1
6
)
1
3
.1
6
(0
.7
6
)
1
2
.7
0
(0
.7
6
)
1
2
.7
2
(0
.7
5
)
1
6
.7
8
(1
.5
7
)
1
6
.8
7
(1
.6
0
)
1
3
.2
8
(0
.8
1
)
9
0
.0
7
(0
.1
6
)
1
.1
9
(1
.6
4
)
0
.0
9
(0
.1
5
)
-1
.5
4
(3
.4
9
)
1
.4
4
(3
.6
5
)
0
.1
3
(0
.2
0
)
1
2
.4
9
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.2
2
(0
.6
5
)
1
2
.2
3
(0
.6
6
)
1
4
.6
4
(1
.3
4
)
1
4
.6
8
(1
.3
4
)
1
2
.5
7
(0
.6
8
)
1
0
-0
.0
2
(0
.1
0
)
-0
.1
0
(0
.9
5
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.1
0
)
-2
.0
1
(1
.7
5
)
-2
.5
8
(1
.8
0
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.1
3
)
1
2
.1
1
(0
.6
2
)
1
1
.8
7
(0
.6
1
)
1
1
.8
6
(0
.6
1
)
1
2
.2
6
(1
.0
2
)
1
2
.2
4
(1
.0
2
)
1
2
.1
6
(0
.6
4
)
1
1
0
.1
3
(0
.1
2
)
1
.9
8
(1
.3
3
)
0
.1
9
(0
.1
2
)
1
.8
5
(1
.9
2
)
1
.5
7
(1
.9
1
)
0
.0
6
(0
.1
4
)
1
3
.0
9
(0
.6
5
)
1
2
.8
4
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.8
6
(0
.6
6
)
1
2
.8
5
(1
.0
6
)
1
2
.8
3
(1
.0
7
)
1
3
.1
4
(0
.6
9
)
1
2
0
.1
8
(0
.1
3
)
1
.9
2
(1
.4
4
)
0
.1
8
(0
.1
3
)
-0
.3
8
(2
.4
1
)
-0
.1
7
(2
.4
3
)
0
.0
9
(0
.1
5
)
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
..
.
56
..
.
ta
bl
e
6
.3
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
N
o
p
ee
r
eff
ec
t
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
IV
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
,b
P
ee
r
n
o
rm
IV
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
c
P
re
fe
rr
ed
b
1
1
.7
2
(0
.6
8
)
1
1
.4
9
(0
.6
8
)
1
1
.4
9
(0
.6
8
)
1
3
.1
0
(1
.2
3
)
1
3
.1
5
(1
.2
4
)
1
1
.7
7
(0
.6
7
)
H
ig
h
es
t
P
a
re
n
ts
’
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
C
o
ll
eg
e
1
1
.1
9
(0
.4
6
)
1
0
.9
5
(0
.4
6
)
1
0
.9
5
(0
.4
5
)
1
1
.7
2
(0
.8
5
)
1
1
.6
5
(0
.8
4
)
1
1
.2
2
(0
.4
6
)
H
ig
h
S
ch
l
1
.2
5
(0
.6
0
)*
*
1
.1
3
(0
.6
0
)*
1
.1
4
(0
.5
9
)*
2
.6
5
(1
.1
1
)*
*
2
.7
7
(1
.1
4
)*
*
1
.2
6
(0
.6
2
)*
*
L
es
s
H
ig
h
S
ch
l
1
.6
9
(0
.8
2
)*
*
1
.5
9
(0
.8
3
)*
1
.5
8
(0
.8
1
)*
*
2
.5
1
(1
.5
5
)*
2
.6
9
(1
.5
3
)*
1
.8
6
(0
.8
5
)*
*
R
a
ce
W
h
it
e
1
3
.7
6
(0
.4
3
)
1
2
.9
6
(0
.3
8
)
1
2
.9
5
(0
.3
8
)
1
5
.6
7
(0
.8
2
)
1
5
.5
5
(0
.8
2
)
1
1
.2
5
(0
.3
7
)
B
la
ck
-4
.8
6
(0
.8
1
)*
*
*
-3
.8
0
(0
.6
8
)*
*
*
-3
.7
4
(0
.6
9
)*
*
*
-6
.7
8
(1
.6
2
)*
*
*
-6
.1
1
(1
.7
5
)*
*
*
7
.0
3
(1
.5
5
)*
*
*
A
si
a
n
-4
.9
7
(1
.1
4
)*
*
*
-3
.8
3
(1
.0
5
)*
*
*
-3
.7
9
(1
.0
6
)*
*
*
-5
.2
1
(2
.0
7
)*
*
-5
.2
0
(2
.1
0
)*
*
*
-1
.4
2
(1
.1
7
)
O
th
er
R
a
ce
s
-0
.9
7
(1
.2
5
)
-0
.1
3
(1
.1
5
)
0
.1
1
(1
.1
5
)
-4
.3
8
(2
.2
6
)*
*
-4
.6
2
(2
.1
9
)*
*
0
.7
1
(1
.1
7
)
G
en
d
er
M
a
le
1
3
.7
7
(0
.4
3
)
1
2
.0
2
(0
.3
9
)
1
2
.0
2
(0
.4
0
)
1
3
.3
3
(0
.7
4
)
1
3
.2
6
(0
.7
4
)
1
2
.3
1
(0
.4
1
)
F
em
a
le
-0
.5
3
(0
.5
5
)
-0
.4
6
(0
.5
4
)
-0
.4
6
(0
.5
5
)
0
.2
6
(1
.0
3
)
0
.4
4
(1
.0
2
)
-0
.2
9
(0
.5
5
)
0
.7
9
(0
.4
4
)
0
.6
9
(0
.4
2
)
0
.6
5
(0
.4
2
)
1
.8
7
(0
.9
3
)*
*
1
.6
8
(0
.9
3
)*
0
.1
1
(0
.4
3
)
A
g
e
1
2
.1
0
(0
.2
8
)
1
1
.7
8
(0
.2
7
)
1
1
.7
9
(0
.2
7
)
1
3
.4
7
(0
.5
1
)
1
3
.6
8
(1
.4
1
)
1
2
.2
2
(0
.3
2
)
G
ra
d
e
7
1
2
.4
0
(1
.6
2
)
1
1
.6
8
(1
.4
2
)
1
1
.5
6
(1
.4
7
)
1
8
.9
1
(3
.9
6
)
2
3
.8
3
(4
.7
8
)
2
6
.9
9
(3
.6
5
)
8
3
.3
0
(1
.2
2
)*
*
*
2
.0
7
(1
.3
5
)
1
.7
6
(1
.4
7
)
2
.2
8
(2
.7
5
)
-1
.8
9
(3
.8
5
)
-8
.2
7
(3
.2
2
)*
*
*
9
0
.1
3
(1
.6
7
)
0
.3
4
(1
.3
9
)
0
.2
8
(1
.4
3
)
-4
.1
0
(3
.8
5
)
-9
.2
3
(4
.5
6
)*
*
-1
4
.7
1
(3
.5
8
)*
*
*
1
0
-0
.9
2
(1
.9
1
)
-0
.4
3
(1
.6
0
)
-0
.2
7
(1
.6
6
)
-6
.4
1
(4
.2
1
)
-1
1
.8
1
(4
.9
3
)*
*
-1
5
.8
5
(3
.7
1
)*
*
*
1
1
-0
.3
7
(2
.2
0
)
0
.1
9
(1
.9
1
)
0
.3
9
(1
.9
6
)
-7
.3
1
(4
.6
9
)
-1
2
.3
4
(5
.4
0
)*
*
-1
7
.0
9
(3
.9
4
)*
*
*
1
2
2
.4
0
(2
.3
6
)
-2
.0
5
(2
.0
8
)
-1
.7
8
(2
.1
3
)
-8
.9
8
(5
.1
4
)*
-1
3
.9
9
(5
.8
1
)*
*
-1
8
.1
7
(4
.0
0
)*
*
*
R
el
ig
io
n
N
o
t
R
el
ig
.
a
t
a
ll
1
3
.6
2
(0
.7
5
)
1
3
.3
6
(0
.7
2
)
1
3
.4
2
(0
.7
3
)
1
3
.4
7
(1
.3
9
)
1
3
.7
5
(1
.4
4
)
1
3
.6
7
(0
.7
8
)
N
o
t
im
p
.
2
.8
3
(1
.4
6
)*
*
2
.6
4
(1
.4
4
)*
2
.6
1
(1
.4
6
)*
5
.1
2
(2
.6
6
)*
*
4
.3
0
(2
.6
8
)*
2
.5
4
(1
.4
7
)*
Im
p
.
-0
.1
0
(0
.8
9
)
-0
.1
7
(0
.8
6
)
-0
.2
2
(0
.8
8
)
1
.5
1
(1
.6
6
)
1
.2
2
(1
.6
4
)
-0
.1
4
(0
.9
4
)
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
..
.
57
..
.
ta
bl
e
6
.3
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
N
o
p
ee
r
eff
ec
t
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
IV
S
ch
l
n
o
rm
a
,b
P
ee
r
n
o
rm
IV
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
c
P
re
fe
rr
ed
b
V
er
y
im
p
o
rt
.
-3
.8
4
(0
.8
6
)*
*
*
-3
.8
8
(0
.8
3
)*
*
*
-3
.9
6
(0
.8
4
)*
*
*
-1
.8
7
(1
.6
5
)
-2
.0
8
(1
.6
7
)
-3
.7
5
(0
.8
9
)*
*
*
a
A
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
t
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
-w
is
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
o
n
th
e
sm
o
k
in
g
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
in
th
e
a
n
a
ly
si
s
sa
m
p
le
.
b
M
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
m
ea
su
re
d
in
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
es
.
F
o
r
ex
a
m
p
le
,
ov
er
a
ll
m
a
rg
in
a
l
p
ee
r
eff
ec
ts
is
1
.0
7
(0
.1
0
)*
*
*
in
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
6
;
th
is
m
ea
n
s
th
a
t
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
ee
r
n
o
rm
ca
u
se
s
a
1
.0
7
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
sm
o
k
in
g
im
it
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
w
it
h
a
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
r
o
f
0
.1
0
.
c
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
o
f
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
th
ro
u
g
h
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
in
g
m
et
h
o
d
.
T
h
e
p
re
se
n
ce
o
f
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
te
rm
s
in
th
e
si
x
sp
ec
ifi
-
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
th
e
ta
b
le
m
a
k
es
it
in
co
n
v
en
ie
n
t
to
w
ri
te
d
ow
n
th
e
a
n
a
ly
ti
ca
l
ex
p
re
ss
io
n
o
f
a
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
t,
so
I
d
o
n
o
t
u
se
th
e
d
el
ta
m
et
h
o
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
.
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
v
el
y,
I
ra
n
d
o
m
ly
sa
m
p
le
a
la
rg
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
o
d
el
co
effi
ci
en
ts
(I
u
se
5
,0
0
0
)
fr
o
m
th
ei
r
es
ti
m
a
te
d
jo
in
t
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
th
en
o
b
ta
in
m
ea
n
s
a
n
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
o
f
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
fr
o
m
th
e
5
,0
0
0
d
iff
er
en
t
m
o
d
el
s.
d
W
h
en
in
tr
o
d
u
ci
n
g
a
u
n
it
ch
a
n
g
e
in
a
va
ri
a
b
le
th
a
t
in
te
ra
ct
s
w
it
h
a
n
o
th
er
va
ri
a
b
le
,
I
a
d
d
a
u
n
it
ch
a
n
g
e
to
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
a
n
d
a
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
ch
a
n
g
e
to
a
ll
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
te
rm
s
th
a
t
in
v
o
lv
e
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
a
s
w
el
l.
e
A
ll
n
u
m
b
er
s
in
it
a
li
cs
a
re
th
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
sm
o
k
in
g
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
ra
te
s
a
t
w
h
ic
h
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
.
F
o
r
ex
a
m
p
le
,
in
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
1
,
th
e
ov
er
a
ll
m
a
rg
in
a
l
ta
x
eff
ec
t
is
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
a
t
1
2
.1
0
(1
.2
8
);
th
is
m
ea
n
s
th
e
sm
o
k
in
g
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
ra
te
is
ex
p
ec
te
d
to
d
ro
p
to
1
2
.1
0
-3
.8
6
=
8
.2
4
p
er
ce
n
t
a
ft
er
a
1
0
-c
en
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
ci
g
a
re
tt
e
ta
x
.
f
F
o
r
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
va
ri
a
b
le
s
su
ch
a
s
ta
x
,
in
co
m
e
a
n
d
et
c.
,
th
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
sm
o
k
in
g
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
ra
te
o
f
th
e
a
n
a
ly
si
s
sa
m
p
le
.
H
ow
ev
er
,
th
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
t
o
f
a
n
o
n
-c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
o
f
a
ca
te
g
o
ri
ca
l
va
ri
a
b
le
is
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
sm
o
k
in
g
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
ra
te
o
f
a
h
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
sa
m
p
le
in
w
h
ic
h
a
ll
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
a
ss
u
m
ed
to
b
e
a
m
em
b
er
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
a
ri
so
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
o
f
th
e
ca
te
g
o
ri
ca
l
va
ri
a
b
le
.
F
o
r
ex
a
m
p
le
,
in
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
6
,
th
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
a
1
2
th
g
ra
d
er
w
it
h
o
u
t
a
sm
o
k
in
g
h
is
to
ry
is
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
sm
o
k
in
g
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
ra
te
o
f
th
e
h
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
sa
m
p
le
in
w
h
ic
h
ev
er
y
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
b
ec
o
m
es
a
7
th
g
ra
d
er
w
it
h
o
u
t
a
sm
o
k
in
g
h
is
to
ry
.
58
Chapter 7
Policy Simulations
Consider a policy intervention that causes a variation in observed public information
(∆Io). Since a Nash equilibrium strategy is a function of public information, such a policy
intervention affects students’ actions on both smoking and peer selection and, in turn, their
peer smoking norms.
Consider a generic school s with ns students under a policy intervention, ∆Io. Let the ns
by 1 vector E(a∗−i,s ;F (.), I +∆I
o) denote the ns students’ ex ante equilibrium peer smoking
norms. We note the following three theoretical inferences. First, according to equation 4.19,
the ex ante peer norm vector is completely determined by a ns × (ns − 1) by 1 ex ante equi-
librium directional friendship probability vector, p(ζj∗i (I +∆I
o;F (.)) = 1), and a ns by 1 ex
ante individual equilibrium smoking probability vector, p(a∗s,j(I + ∆I
o;F (.)) = 1). Second,
the ex ante individual smoking probability vector is partially determined by an ex ante equi-
librium smoking norm vector due to peer effects on smoking. Third, the ex ante equilibrium
friendship vector is partially determined by the ex ante individual smoking probability vector
that affects directional deviations in smoking probabilities among schoolmates. Hence, the
ex ante equilibrium peer smoking norm vector, the ex ante equilibrium directional friendship
probability vector, and the ex ante individual smoking probability vector are interdependent
at a PSBNE. In other words, these three vectors should be consistent among themselves at a
PSBNE. With this caveat in mind, in a policy simulation, I iterate an initial ex ante equilib-
rium individual smoking probability vector over the estimated smoking behavioral equation
and the estimated friendship equation. In each iteration the three ex ante probability vectors
are updated once. An equilibrium emerges when the iterated ex ante smoking probability
vector converges uniformly across all schoolmates.
Prior to further discussion of the policy simulation, let us first examine how it is affected
by data limitations. Due to the lack of knowledge of a respondent’s state of residency in
Add Health, I do not have instrumental variables (e.g., lagged cigarette price and lagged
state cigarette tax) to explain lagged smoking behavior. This data limitation motivates me
to only estimate a smoking behavioral equation for students without smoking histories. Re-
garding friendship formation, however, students without smoking histories are able to choose
schoolmates with smoking histories as friends. This implies that in the policy simulation it
is appropriate to allow for friendship formation between any two schoolmates regardless of
their smoking histories. Thus, in operation I have to use the estimated behavioral smoking
equation based on students without smoking histories to update ex ante individual smoking
probabilities for students with smoking histories. Such a practice is flawed because it ignores
the effect of a student’s lagged smoking on her current smoking decisions. As a consequence,
the simulation results presented below should be interpreted with caution.
Table 7.1 shows the basic information in the two schools used in policy simulation. The
first school has 55 students and the second school, 63. State cigarette tax is 28 cents in
the first school and 75 cents in the second school. The original equilibrium smoking rates
in the first school and the second school are 5.45% and 33.33%, respectively.1 In the policy
simulation, I perturb cigarette taxes by adding an additional amount of tax to the original
state cigarette tax. For comparison purposes, I solve for equilibrium smoking rates with
and without peer effects at each tax level. In simulating equilibrium smoking rates without
peer effects, I set the coefficient estimates corresponding to grade-specific peer effects in
the estimated smoking equation (Table 6.2) and the coefficient estimates corresponding to
directional deviations in smoking dimension in the friendship equation (Table 6.1) to zeros.
Parameters used in simulation are randomly drawn from the estimated distribution of smoking
equation parameters and the estimated distribution of friendship equation parameters.
Figure 7.1 presents the simulation results in the two schools. The upper panel is the first
school; the lower panel is the second school. Overall, with or without peer effects, as tax in-
1The original equilibrium smoking rate is just the smoking rate observed in the Add Health data.
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creases the smoking rate decreases. Interestingly, in the presence of peer effects, tax increases
in certain ranges may cause ”abnormal” increases in the smoking rate (e.g., tax increase=40
cents, in the first school). We note if the friendship network does not change as taxes increase,
then a tax increase should monotonically pull down the smoking rate. These ”abnormal” in-
creases in the smoking rate reflect that a variation in the cigarette tax motivates agents to
update their smoking decision and their friendships as well. Regarding the social multiplier
effect, in both schools, we see that compared with having no peer effects, a given tax increase
causes a dramatically larger drop in smoking rate in the presence of peer effects. This indi-
cates peer effects significantly amplify tax deterrent effects. Meanwhile, in both schools the
presence of peer effects significantly increases the smoking rate over the entire range of the
cigarette tax increases. Collectively, simulation results suggest that although peer influence
significantly amplifies the cigarette tax deterrent effect, it mainly promotes teen smoking ini-
tiation. Also we note under peer effects, at certain tax thresholds, the smoking rate drops
abruptly (e.g., tax increase=7 cents in the first school). This indicates that at those tax
thresholds the social multiplier effect is particularly large (herding behavior appears).
Table 7.1: Two Schools Used in Policy Simulation
School No. of students 1995 state cig. Tax Smoking rate
1 55 28 5.45
2 63 75 33.33
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Figure 7.1: Equilibrium Smoking Rate: Peer Effects vs. No Peer Effects
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Appendix: Characterization of Allowed Decision Space
Let Bi(d−i,t) denote the set of player i’s decisions allowed by her individual budget con-
straint and other nt − 1 players’ decisions (d−i,t).
Bi(d−i,t) = {di,t|C(di,t; d−i,t, zt)− Yi,t ≤ 0}
Proposition 1. If a collection of nt individual decision sets {D˜1, ..., D˜i, ..., D˜nt} (D˜i ⊆ Di
∀i ∈ Nt) in the game satisfy
D˜i =
⋃
d˜−i,t∈D˜−i
Bi(d˜−i,t) ∀i ∈ Nt (7.1)
then the Cartesian product
∏
i
D˜i is an ADS of the game.
where
⋃
d˜−i,t∈D˜−i
Bi(d˜−i,t) is the union of those player i’s decision sets corresponding to all
different combinations of nt − 1 players’ decisions. D˜−i is a Cartesian product defined as
D˜−i =
∏
j∈Nt\{i}
D˜j
Proof. Let K(
∏
i
D˜i) denote the number of elements in
∏
i
D˜i.
∀k = 1, 2, ...,K(
∏
i
D˜i) and ∀i ∈ Nt , let [d˜ki,t d˜k−i,t] = d˜kt denote the bi-decomposition of
an element in
∏
i
D˜i, which decomposes d˜kt into the decision made by player i (d˜
k
i,t) and the
decisions made by the rest nt − 1 players (d˜k−i,t).
We note, d˜kt ∈
∏
i
D˜i ⇒ d˜k−i,t ∈ D˜−i. In turn, d˜k−i,t ∈ D˜−i and D˜i =
⋃
d˜−i,t∈D˜−i
Bi(d˜−i,t) ⇒
Bi(d˜k−i,t) ⊆ D˜i. This says ∀i ∈ Nt and ∀k = 1, 2, ...,K(
∏
i
D˜i), the set of player i’s decisions
allowed by dk−i,t and her individual budget constraint is a subset of the D˜i. Recall
∏
i∈Nt
D˜i is a
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Cartesian product of D˜is, therefore, ∀i ∈ Nt and ∀k = 1, 2, ...,K(
∏
i
D˜i), d˜i,t ∈
∏
i
D˜i satisfies
nt budget constraints simultaneously. Q.E.D.
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